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Over the last fifty years food production per person in Africa has grown disappointingly slowly at little more 
than 10%. The population of Africa is growing rapidly at an average annual rate of 2.5% and is expected to 
almost double by 2050 to close to two billion people. Chronic hunger on the continent is high; nearly 23% of the 
population are classed as hungry, many of whom are farmers owning less than two hectares of land. Smallholder 
farms in sub-Saharan Africa number around 33 million, represent 80% of all farms in the region, and contribute 
up to 90% of food production in some sub-Saharan African countries. Developing smallholder agriculture can be 
effective in reducing poverty and hunger in low income countries but only through sustainable access to markets 
can poor farmers increase the income from their labour and lift themselves and their families out of poverty.  
Most poor farmers are not linked to markets for a variety of reasons: remoteness, low production, low farm-
gate prices, and lack of information, to name a few. Addressing and overcoming these market failures in 
order to increase smallholder farmers’ access to markets was the subject of this research project. In short, 
the project aimed to answer the question: how can smallholders in sub-Saharan Africa use a combination 
of agricultural growth and links to markets to raise their incomes and reduce poverty and hunger? What 
follows is a summary of the considerations, conclusions and recommendations that resulted from the 
synthesis and exploration of existing material, case studies and workshops. 
First, an enabling investment climate and the provision of rural public goods, provided by the state, are 
necessary conditions to ensure fair and efficient market linkages but they are not always sufficient. 
Second, most smallholders have limited access to inputs, technical advice, insurance, credit and other 
financial services, and to output markets. Improving their access is a major challenge for smallholder 
agricultural development.
Third, successful links between smallholders and markets require consideration and planning around 
three sets of factors:
Business case for smallholders and their partners in supply chains
 ● Governments need to provide an enabling investment climate in rural areas: peace and security, a 
stable macro-economy, and key institutions such as property rights, and trading standards (such as 
weights and measures). 
 ● Governments have to invest in rural public goods: roads and power; education, health care and clean 
water; and agricultural research and extension.
 ● The fast-growing domestic and regional markets in Africa’s cities are less demanding and more 
dependable than those for high-value exports.
Actions must follow the needs of smallholder farmers who may variously seek to maximise output or prices, 
or to reduce risks in production and marketing, or a combination of both. 
SUMMARY
ix
Approaches to linking 
 ● Those seeking to improve links, be they private enterprise, government agency or non-governmental 
organisation, need to emphasise facilitation, enabling, learning and flexibility.
 ● Support to novel linkages may be temporarily needed, but exit strategies need to be in place.
 ● Leadership by programme managers can help to resolve tensions between control in the short run and 
the need for adaptation in the longer run.
 ● At the same time, managers on the ground must have the flexibility, resources and political support to 
adapt programmes to emerging circumstances. 
Organising the links 
 ● Linkages between farmers and markets usually need to be organised by a catalyst: either a private firm 
as supply chain champion; or by a non-governmental organisation, often in partnership with private firms.
 ● Rarely can large-scale firms in supply chains deal directly with individual small-scale farmers. The 
costs are usually too high. Hence farmers have to be grouped, either directly in farmer groups, 
associations or cooperatives, or indirectly through local input dealers or appointed distributors, lead 
farmers or bank agents.
 ● Contracting is the most common linkage although this can take many forms. 
 ● No one form of linkage is ideal.
Three conclusions arise from these considerations:
First, most linkages do not reach the most poor and highly vulnerable. 
 ● Their priorities are probably best met by creating jobs, building their assets, improving their health and 
education, and in providing social protection. Market links will not provide multiple wins. 
Second, if successful cases are to be scaled up to increase their reach and impact then a variety of models 
and processes must be considered. Scaling up does not lie in a particular and specific arrangement: a 
particular form of contracting, or an ideal agricultural cooperative. 
 ● Approaches, not form, lead to effective links. 
 ● What then needs scaling, replicating and adapting are processes of enabling, facilitation and learning. 
 ● Supported by a necessary architecture that includes catalysts of change, forums to consider and address 
specific problems and mechanisms to group farmers.
Third, while some links, usually for high value cash crops, need little public stimulus, for staple crops, there 
seem to be few private initiatives that address the lack of access.
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 ● Is there, therefore, a case for public subsidies? Public action to make links that lead to additional production 
that, especially in landlocked markets, pushes down prices to the benefit of poor households, may be justified.
The final report that follows presents analysis and investigation into different examples of linking 
smallholders to markets. Future action can be informed by the successes and challenges discussed.  
RECOMMENDATIONS
Governments need to:
 ● Focus on the basic public roles of setting an enabling investment climate and providing rural public 
goods. Perfection is not necessary: more important is to remedy the worst deficiencies. Donors can 
support with technical assistance on the investment climate, and by funding investments in low 
income countries where public resources are currently insufficient.
Three dimensions in linking smallholders to markets
BUSINESS CASE (FOR SMALLHOLDERS AND PARTNERS IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN)
• Essential public roles include: 
• Building an enabling rural investment climate and 
• Providing rural public goods: roads, health, education, water,
 
research and extension
• When choosing a market for produce, domestic, regional markets
 
may often be better than exports
• Determine the focus for working with smallholder farmers; production
 
or marketing; maximising returns or 
reducing risk. This may change over time
ORGANISING THE LINKS
• Find champions, catalysts to make the links
• Group smallholder farmers to overcome 
diseconomies of small-scale 
• Use forms of linkage appropriate to local and 
market conditions
APPROACHES TO LINKING
• Enable and facilitate, don’t replace
• Plan for temporary support, and an exit 
strategy
• Learning and overcoming unforeseen 
obstacles will be required
xi
 ● Set up forums for value-chains with participation of key players, with political backing and linked to 
decision-making. 
 ● Fund promising initiatives to link smallholders to markets, either through competitive challenge funds 
or by administrative allocation. Donors can support with technical advice and funds.
Donors can support governments and otherwise need to: 
 ● Accept that processes of engagement matter, that these take time and involve risk. If donor 
agencies cannot operate accordingly, then work through non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
that can, or set up challenge funds. Investing in a portfolio of efforts should ensure that even with 
disappointments there will be enough success to justify outlays. 
 ● Beware of focusing excessively on projects to promote engagement of smallholders with high-value, 
export markets: they are an option for only a minority of smallholders. Most need steering towards 
domestic and regional markets.
Non-governmental organisations need to:
 ● Continue to pioneer innovative approaches, especially linking smallholders to the private sector in 
productive and equitable ways; and
 ● Beware of depending too much on particular projects and models: keep options open, stay flexible. 
Accept that some initiatives may fail: work with portfolios;
Large-scale agricultural investors need to:
 ● Appreciate that smallholders can be effective suppliers, but that finding effective ways to do this may 
take time and persistence; and 
 ● It may not be necessary to acquire land and go into farming, with corresponding investment 
costs and risks; even if there are exceptions, such as nucleus estates, to guarantee throughput to 
processing plants and to act as demonstrations for out-growers. 
All need to:
Monitor the results of these initiatives, learn from them and publish the results. Donors with 
their international overview are well placed to encourage learning, by reviewing experiences and 
disseminating the lessons. Donors can link practitioners, looking for innovative ways to communicate. 
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INTRODUCTION
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SETTING THE SCENE
Over the last fifty years food production in Africa has grown disappointingly slowly: especially when 
compared to the rapid growth of population. While Africa has seen food production per person rise by little 
more than 10% over almost 50 years, Asia has more than doubled food production per person in this time, 
while for South America the increase has been 84%,  see Figure 1.1. This is not to say that there have not 
been successes in Africa for particular crops, or in particular districts: there have been (Gabre-Madhin and 
Haggblade 2001, Wiggins 2005), but they have been limited and often not sustained. 
Much of farming in Africa is low in productivity, in yields per hectare and in returns to labour, giving farm 
households poor livelihoods and leaving them vulnerable to bad weather and economic shocks, such as 
sudden food price spikes. 
Figure 1.1  |  Food production per capita, Africa compared to Asia and 
South America since 1961/63
source: compiled from food and agriculture organisation of the united nations (fao) data 
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3Since the turn of the new century, interest in agriculture in Africa has revived. Setting the first Millennium 
Development Goal as halving poverty and hunger directed attention to where the poor and hungry live: 
overwhelmingly in rural areas where agriculture is usually the largest source of livelihoods and jobs. When 
the agriculture ministers of Africa met in Maputo in 2003 they declared that they would strive for 6% annual 
growth of agriculture and would devote 10% of government budgets to that end. This led to adoption of the 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) drawn up by the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) secretariat as a way to achieve the production goal by the African Union.
Accelerating growth in agriculture in the continent depends on macro-economic policies that limit inflation 
and allow competitive exchange rates, public investments and the adoption of more productive and 
appropriate technology (Diao et al. 2012, FAO 2012, World Bank 2007). In the process farmers, most of them 
smallholders, will raise their productivity and output by engaging more with markets, not only producing and 
selling more, but also buying in more purchased inputs, accessing financial and other services, and obtaining 
technical assistance. The better these markets function, the more growth can be expected.
It is not surprising, then, that there are many practical initiatives to find ways to link smallholders to markets 
more effectively; actions taken by groups of farmers, traders, processors, NGOs and some government 
agencies. This is the subject of this report. 
AIMS OF THIS REPORT
The Leaping and Learning: Strategies for Taking Agricultural Successes to Scale programme aims to 
contribute to debates about smallholder development in Sub-Saharan Africa, so that: 
Public and private development partners have a greater understanding of the factors that are necessary 
and of the actions they can take to support smallholder agricultural development projects at scale in 
Sub-Saharan Africa to boost food and nutrition security and support poverty reduction. 
As will be set out in more detail in the next chapter, developing smallholder agriculture can be effective in 
reducing poverty and hunger in low income countries where other economic opportunities are, for the time 
being, often limited. The basic requirements for accelerated agricultural growth in Africa are well understood: 
a rural investment climate that is conducive to investment and innovation by farmers and those in the 
supply chain; and public investment in rural public goods, including roads and other physical infrastructure, 
investments in rural people — education, health, water and sanitation, and agricultural research and 
extension (see section 3.1). These are necessary but not always sufficient conditions for growth.
Beyond that, if small farmers — the vast bulk of Africa’s farmers — are to take advantage of opportunities 
in markets, then additional action often needs to be taken to improve smallholders’ access to inputs, credit 
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and other financial services, to technical advice, and to output markets — and especially those with growing 
demand and attractive prices. Several limitations restrict access, some of them arising from the high costs 
of information in negotiations between smallholders and other, usually larger-scale, agents in agricultural 
supply chains. How to do this effectively, economically, and in ways that are sustainable and encourage 
private initiative, is only partly known. Hence this investigation began with the following questions:
 ● How can small-scale family farms in Africa be best linked to markets, to sell surpluses and to obtain 
inputs, finance and know-how to stimulate agricultural growth and reduce poverty? 
 ● How can this be done both effectively and equitably?
 ● How can successes be scaled up and replicated? 
APPROACH AND METHODS
From the outset, it was assumed — based on existing literature and personal knowledge from several African 
countries —that there were already many initiatives, some reasonably well documented, to address the 
issue of linking smallholders to markets that have been started since the late 1990s. Hence, it was decided 
not to carry out primary research in the field that would have been costly, time-consuming, and would 
probably only have generated insights specific to a limited range of particular geographical areas, crops and 
enterprises. Instead, it was decided to draw on what was documented, and above all to examine particular 
cases already documented. As the work progressed it became clear that there were indeed many such 
initiatives, more than the team expected.
The following activities were thus carried out:
 ● The formal, published literature on market linkages in Africa was reviewed, in particular those studies 
that synthesised insights from primary research and case studies; 
 ● Stakeholders were consulted by Firetail to gain a clear picture of the groups that the project is aiming to 
support, explore which content and information different groups need, understand how to present and 
communicate programme output and to discuss how this can be delivered in a way that will maximise 
impact and increase take-up of the recommendations among different groups; 
 ● Case studies were identified from citations in the literature, from suggestions from specialists, and from 
personal knowledge. Secondary reports on the initiatives themselves and complementary information 
on the area or enterprise were collected; and,
 ● Specialists and practitioners were consulted for their views and insights, primarily in the form of three 
one-day workshops held in July 2012 in Accra, Johannesburg and Nairobi, see Appendix A.  
5CASE STUDIES AND THEIR SELECTION
The cases were sampled purposively. Three criteria were set for selection; the most obvious being that there 
had to be some secondary account of the experience that could be obtained. That, however, introduces a 
bias towards experiences that have been successful and hence survived. This is a familiar problem — see 
Barrett et al. (2012) on contract farming — with private and collective initiatives. If the experience of business 
start-ups is any guide, it is to be expected that some, perhaps many, will fail. Most market links are business 
propositions within competitive markets: when they fail, farmers and firms in the supply chains lose money 
and hence abandon, or change, what they do. These experiences, not surprisingly, are rarely documented.
A second decision was to try to avoid the bias in existing accounts towards supply chains for export and 
high-value niche products, preferring to look for cases that dealt with larger markets within Africa and with 
more mainstream products. The criterion was not absolute: there are some exports and niche products in 
the cases, but the intention was to avoid such cases dominating, given the focus in some publications on 
products and markets that will probably only ever support the livelihoods of a minority of African farmers. 
The third criterion was to look for cases with a reasonably even spread across differing contexts. Given the 
importance for agricultural development of an enabling rural investment climate and a supply of rural public 
goods, cases from differing contexts were selected. Hence, indices were created for these characteristics 
at national level, so that a four-section grid was constructed that rated countries in Africa as above and 
below the regional means for these two dimensions. Cases were sampled to make sure that there were a 
reasonable number from each. Appendix B sets out the indices, their computation, and hence, into which of 
the four sections the countries belonged. 
Thirty cases was the target set for this study: as many as could be investigated in the time available, but 
enough to avoid becoming blinded by a small number of exceptional experiences. Table 1.1 (overleaf) sets out 
the selection that resulted. Details of the cases can be found in Appendix C and can be downloaded from 
http://www.odi.org.uk/leapandlearn
For each case, secondary documentation was reviewed, key points were identified and the results compared 
and contrasted. 
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COUNTRY ENTERPRISE OR PRODUCT PROGRAMME, SPONSOR, OR CHAMPION
COUNTRIES ABOVE AVERAGE IN INVESTMENT CLIMATE AND RURAL GOODS
GHANA Sorghum
Pineapples
Rice, soya, maize, sorghum 
Guinness 
Blue Skies
AGRA
KENYA Green beans 
Green beans 
Peas, mangetout
Maize and beans 
Tea
Dairy
Small brokers
Homegrown
VegPro
One Acre Fund (OAF)
Kenya Tea Development Agency
Kieni Dairy Products Limited, 
SOUTH AFRICA Fresh vegetables
Fair trade wine and fresh fruit  
SPAR
Thandi
UGANDA Potatoes 
Sorghum
Sunflower 
Nando’s
SAB Miller
Mukwano industries
ABOVE AVERAGE RURAL INVESTMENT CLIMATE, BELOW AVERAGE RURAL PUBLIC GOODS
BENIN Rice VECO
ETHIOPIA Honey Support to Business Organisations and their 
Access to Markets (BOAM)
MOZAMBIQUE Cashew Small processing plants
RWANDA Various
 
Coffee
AgriProFocus (APF) and International Cocoa 
Organisation (ICCO) lead
National strategy
TOGO Soya Service Provider and Producer Organisation 
(SPPO) Soja Nyo (SN)
Table 1.1  |  Cases of market linkages selected
7COUNTRY ENTERPRISE OR PRODUCT PROGRAMME, SPONSOR, OR CHAMPION
BELOW AVERAGE RURAL INVESTMENT CLIMATE, ABOVE AVERAGE RURAL PUBLIC GOODS
BURKINA FASO Shea butter Nununa Federation
SOUTHERN AFRICA Fresh vegetables Freshmark
ZAMBIA Cotton
Rice
Dunavant
Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV)
ZIMBABWE Improved seeds
Agro dealers providing seed, fertiliser
SNV 
SNV
BELOW AVERAGE RURAL INVESTMENT CLIMATE, ABOVE AVERAGE RURAL PUBLIC GOODS
NIGERIA Fertiliser PrOpCom, DFID
TANZANIA Cassava
Horticulture
Producer Organisations
Mara Smallholder Horticultural Project (MSHP)
MIXED CASES
BENIN, BURKINA 
FASO, MALI
Cotton Producer Organisations
EAST AFRICA Staples, including maize, beans, potato Linking Local Learners (LLL)
 
 
Full text for the 31 case studies researched for this report can be downloaded directly from the ODI 
website, at http://www.odi.org.uk/leapandlearn
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THE REPORT
The rest of this report begins with a review of the literature relevant for this study. First, it looks at the 
relation of smallholder development to increased incomes, reduced poverty and improved food security 
and nutrition. It reviews debates about the current relatively low engagement of many small farmers in 
Africa with markets, above all with those for inputs and finance. After that it examines the recent literature 
on experiences of trying to improve the links between smallholders and markets. 
This review then forms the basis for a three-part framework to organise thinking about links, drawing 
on the material from the cases. Questions about the degree of social inclusiveness and gender 
aspects are addressed. 
Finally, the conclusions restate key points, discuss social inclusion, set out what may be scaled up 
and look at the case for public subsidy of efforts to improve links for smallholders growing staples. 
Recommendations for key actors are drawn out. 
9Governments need to 
provide an enabling 
investment climate in 
rural areas.
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 MARKET LINKS, SMALLHOLDER 
DEVELOPMENT AND REDUCING 
POVERTY AND HUNGER: 
THE LITERATURE
11
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This review looks first at the relationship between smallholders engaging with markets and the impacts  
on poverty and food security, arguing that while greater commercialisation does not guarantee 
improved food security, often it does improve food security. Then it turns to what is known about current 
engagement with markets by smallholders and why this may be less than optimal. The final section looks 
at what is known about particular institutions, such as contracting and producer organisations, as ways 
to improve linkages. It concludes by synthesising the consensus that can be seen in reviews of linkages 
published in the last few years.  
2.1  SMALLHOLDERS, MARKETS, POVERTY AND FOOD SECURITY
FROM ENGAGEMENT WITH MARKETS TO HIGHER FARM INCOMES
For many, it is an article of faith that small farmers can benefit from greater engagement with markets, both 
for increased output for sale, as well for inputs and services that can raise productivity. It is easy to see why. 
Markets allow farmers to benefit from increased production: limited demand in village and district markets 
can be overcome by selling to more distant urban and export markets, where not only is demand larger, but 
also consumers may be prepared to pay for additional quality and variety of produce. Output markets should 
allow farmers to specialise, growing those crops in which they have advantages, then use the proceeds 
of sales to obtain whatever else they need for household consumption. Input markets can allow farmers 
access to technologies embodied in new seed, fertiliser, chemicals and machinery with which they can work 
more productively. Credit and other financial services can help them manage cash flows and to invest as 
opportunity suggests, rather than as cash flows permit.
Theory aside, what does the empirical record suggest about the benefits of market engagement or 
‘commercialisation’? Ideally there would be statistics on degrees of commercialisation and average farm 
incomes by household, with similar statistics on other determinants of income, to allow this proposition to 
be tested. However, no such comprehensive data sets exist, although some household surveys and other 
observations through time give indications of the relationships. 
For Bangladesh, Philippines, Tamil Nadu (India) and Thailand, household surveys in the 1980s were 
compared to those in the mid-2000s (Otsuka and Yamano 2008) to examine changes in real household 
incomes, comparing areas of high and marginal potential, see Figure 2.1. In all cases, agriculture was growing 
and farmers were increasingly engaged with markets. In all areas other than marginal parts of Thailand, 
farm incomes had risen over the twenty or so years between surveys. Those increases were quite modest, 
however, often less than a 25% increase. Overall rural household incomes increased by more, since in all 
cases except high potential Tamil Nadu, non-farm incomes rose by much more than farm incomes — a point 
taken up in the next section. 
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Figure 2.1 (a)  |  Changes in real household incomes, high potential rural 
areas, 1980s to 2003/04
source: compiled from data in otsuka and yamano 2008. incomes were measured in constant terms.
Figure 2.1 (b)  |  Changes in real household incomes, marginal potential 
rural areas, 1980s to 2003/04
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Figure 2.2  |  Farm output per person, Machakos, 1930 to 1987
source: figure 1, tiffen and mortimore 1994
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More detailed breakdown of these statistics, moreover, show that income gains were more or less equal 
across social groups defined by access to land: income gains were broadly shared and not concentrated 
amongst any landholding class.
Within Africa, an example of what can happen comes from the central highlands of Kenya. In response 
to the Emergency declared in 1952, the colonial government aimed to reduce rural discontent by 
transforming the small farms of the African reserves — previously seen as being places where the 
indigenous population could subsist while providing temporary migrant labour for the larger, settler 
farms. The strategy envisaged in the Swynnerton Plan of 1954 was to encourage small farmers to grow 
cash crops, above all coffee and tea; the state playing a key role in providing technical assistance, access 
to inputs and marketing (Bates 1989, Leys 1975). 
The Swynnerton Plan largely succeeded: the uptake of commercial crops was widespread, creating 
major exports of beverages for Kenya while boosting farmer incomes. The northern hills of Machakos 
were typical of the central highlands where much coffee was planted from the 1950s onwards. Gross 
margins of coffee were much higher than grains and pulses and incomes rose correspondingly for the 
farmers planting the new crops (Tiffen et al. 1994). In this area, as indeed over much of Central Province 
plus Embu and Meru Districts, the introduction of cash crops was accompanied by intensification of 
food crops, such as maize using higher yielding hybrids, thus sparing the amount of land that had to be 
planted for home consumption. The first round of commercial enterprises was later followed by others, 
including intensive small-scale dairying and production of vegetables. Thanks to commercialisation 
and intensification, farm incomes rose — even at a time when rapid population growth threatened 
impoverishment as the land was divided into ever smaller plots. 
Figure 2.2 shows how farm output, measured in maize equivalents and averaged over the district, rose from 
1930, before the introduction of cash cropping, through to 1987. The first part of the diagram (a) values 
produce at 1957 prices in maize equivalents and thus is effectively a physical production index. The second 
part (b) shows the effects of changes in the relative returns to different crops: value is still measured in 
maize equivalents to give a production index, but this time the relative values of different crops to maize 
are set at 1957, 1977 and 1987 levels. On this reckoning, output per person fell between 1977 and 1987, since 
coffee prices on world markets fell sharply in the first half of the 1980s — even though there was rising 
physical output per person.
The success of cash crops was not at the expense of food crops. Indeed, the majority of the land on 
Machakos — as much as three-quarters — remained planted to maize, beans, peas and other staples. Despite 
rapid population growth, output of grains and pulses per capita rose from 200kg in 1930 to 250kg by 1987. 
Net food imports into the district fell. 
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BENEFITS ACROSS THE RURAL ECONOMY THROUGH LINKAGES
Linkages can multiply and spread the benefits of growth on smallholdings: through rising demand for 
labour and other inputs on farms; in more jobs downstream of the farm in processing, trading, transport and 
storage; and, through consumption, in jobs created when small farmers spend additional incomes on locally 
produced goods and services — including furniture, entertainment, food and drink, and house improvements.
Some crops grown for sale can have high labour requirements, higher than those for staple crops. In 
Machakos, Kenya, small farms with coffee, fruit and vegetables were typically hiring in the equivalent one 
full-time worker for each hectare cultivated (Tiffen 1992). More recently in Kenya, the demand for labour in 
French bean growing has been reported as 1,300 days a hectare a year; for chilli peppers, okra, onions and 
aubergines 540–690 days; as compared to 175 days for maize and beans (Scheltema 2002). In the Guinea 
savannah of northern Nigeria in the 1980s maize production for sale boomed, encouraged by urban demand 
and the spread of improved varieties. Labour demand on fields rose, raising wages and drawing in migrants 
to the zone (Goldman and Smith 1995). 
Farm jobs are usually not well paid, but from the relatively few studies that exist on agricultural wages, they 
would seem to increase when agricultural output and productivity rise. For example, between 1983 and 2004 
farm wages rose by at least 50% in real terms for all but two States of India (Lanjouw and Murgai 2008); 
a similar, roughly 50% increase was seen in agricultural wages in neighbouring Bangladesh for the same 
period, linked to rising agricultural productivity (Hossain 2008). In Senegal, those finding work on large farms 
producing vegetables for export to the EU have higher incomes and less chance of being poor than those 
similar households not employed on the large farms. (Maertens and Swinnen 2009). Indeed, in this case, it 
seems that when women are employed on the estates, the chances of their children going to school rise as 
well (Maertens and Verhofstat 2012). 
Some estimates of multipliers in rural Africa are high, see Figure 2.3. Most of the effect comes from 
consumption rather than production. Strong multipliers reflect the high fractions of additional income 
likely to be spent locally.
Although generally studies show that farmers who have commercialised more have higher incomes than 
those who have not, surveys often show that the total value of marketed production is quite low. 
Look back, for example, at the estimate of farm incomes in Machakos in 1987: these are expressed as maize 
equivalents per head, in 1957 terms, reporting an average of less than 1.2 tonnes of maize. Hence, for that to lift 
people out of dollar-a-day poverty the value of the maize would have to be more than US$300. In 1957 maize 
on the world market was worth around US$400 a tonne, in 2007 dollars.1 Hence the average household in 
Machakos would escape extreme poverty, but not by that much, and would fall well short of US$2 a day. 
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Figure 2.3  |  Growth multipliers for rural Africa, mid to late 1980s. 
Impact of extra income from farm tradables
source: delgado et al. 1994 
note: different estimates relate to degree of tradability of marketed farm produce
In Madagascar in the early 2000s more than 9,000 small farmers were contracted to grow green beans 
for export to Europe. However, their contracts were limited to plots of just one hundredth of a hectare 
— although many households had more than one — and the total price paid for the beans off this small 
plot was just US$20, out of which US$5 had to be paid back for fertiliser, seed and chemicals advanced 
by the company. On average the contracted households had a net income of US$45 a year from their 
vegetables (Minten et al. 2011). For very poor farmers this helped them get through the lean season, but 
it was hardly enough to lift them out of poverty. 
In summary, production by smallholders for market can raise the incomes of farmers as well as 
generating additional incomes for other rural households through linkages in production and above all, 
in consumption. In some cases, however, the income gains are relatively limited, if welcome, owing to the 
small-scale of production for market. 
Income is one thing: but do these gains come at the cost of household food security? 
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MARKET ENGAGEMENT AND FOOD SECURITY
A longstanding concern in agricultural development is that the lure of demand for cash crops might lead 
smallholders to switch their land to these, cut back on production of food for the household, reduce their 
consumption of food and hence reduce food and nutrition security (Maxwell and Fernando 1989). This might 
occur through reduced production of food on the farm leading to lower domestic consumption; coupled 
with failure to spend any incomes from cash crops on food or other items that might contribute to nutrition, 
such as water and health care; or through increased demands on the labour of caregivers leading to less 
care of infants, in particular too little time to prepare and serve complementary foods. Even where additional 
incomes from cash crops might be spent on food crops, this could expose farm households to additional 
risks from volatile prices that may be high when the food is needed.
How widespread and severe are these potential dangers? 
Does producing more cash crops mean cutting back on production of staples for home use? Small farmers 
rarely specialise in commercial crops: when production for the market increases, this tends to be additional 
to current farm enterprises so that cash cropping may lead to greater diversity of production, rather than 
less. In Ethiopia (Sharp et al. 2007) households have diversified their crops and livestock enterprises, rather 
than expanding a single enterprise. In Kenya, in areas that have grown coffee for export since the 1950s, it 
was still the case in the 1980s that as little as 10–20% of the land was under coffee, the rest being devoted 
to diverse food crops, despite the returns to coffee being far higher than those to staples (Haugerud 1988). 
The same reluctance to depend on markets for staple foods in Machakos District in the late 1980s and early 
1990s was also reported by Tiffen (1992).
Aversion to risk probably explains the reluctance to specialise: to higher risks in incomes that could arise 
from relying on a single crop; and, the risks for consumption if they were to rely on buying in staples were 
there to be times of shortage and high prices.
Not only are cash crops often additional to food crops, but also growing cash crops may boost staples 
production. Cash incomes can allow better seed, or fertiliser, to be bought for the staple crop. On contract 
farming schemes diversion of some of the fertiliser and chemicals supplied to grow the cash crop from 
them to staples is frequently reported, as seen in northern Ghana where part of the fertiliser supplied by 
companies for cotton was switched to food crops (Dorward et al. 1998).2 In other cases, fertiliser applied to 
an annual cash crop planted in rotation with staples may confer some residual benefits to the staple grown 
the year after. This has been seen for maize and sorghum after cotton is grown in the Sahel (Bassett 1988), 
as well as for rice sown on plots previously under green beans in Madagascar (Minten et al. 2011). 
Furthermore, given the desire to maintain household self-sufficiency, higher yields from fields of staples 
have tended to promote cash cropping, sometimes as a pre-condition for this to take place. In Kenya, 
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the spread of coffee and other cash crops in densely settled central parts of the country was boosted 
by the introduction of hybrid maize that made it possible to feed the household off a smaller maize plot 
(Tiffen et al 1994). 
Studies that allow comparison of volumes of marketed produce with production of staples by different 
households commonly report that the two correlate positively, not negatively. For example, in Zambia in 
the 1980s, surveyed farmers were categorised according to their maize sales into subsistent, emergent 
or commercial: as the average area of a farm increased, so did the area planted to staples, as did the 
amount of maize, millet and beans retained by households for their own consumption (Moore and 
Vaughan 1987). This did not, however, mean that the children of commercial farm households were 
better nourished, as will shortly be seen. 
Surveys carried out since 2008 confirm this for selected villages in Ethiopia, Malawi and Tanzania, see 
Figure 2.4. By area planted to food crops, farmers were not sacrificing food crops to grow crops for 
sale. On the contrary, most farmers had one hectare or more sown to food crops: the areas planted to 
these bore little relation to the degree of commercialisation. Where it was possible to compare farmers 
participating in a commercialisation to scheme to those not doing so, those commercialising were at the 
median planting more food crops than those who were not part of the scheme — see the last two sets 
of columns in Figure 2.4. 
Looking at both sets of statistics, it seems that farmers are reluctant to plant less than one hectare3 of food 
crops, so that for central Malawi, where farms sizes average 1.6 hectare, almost three-quarters of the farm is 
sown to food, while in Lume District, Ethiopia where farms are twice as large, the fraction falls to one third — 
although the area under food crops remains similar. 
At a national level, an early review, Maxwell and Fernando (1989), reported that countries that produce 
more cash crops also tend to produce more food crops as well. That still seems to apply. If the growth of 
production of cereals in the developing world is compared to the growth of other agricultural produce from 
1990 to 2010, the correlation is high: 0.95 for Africa, 0.97 for South America and 0.91 for Asia. There is little to 
indicate that staple food production trades off against that of other agriculture.4 
Is additional income from agricultural sales spent on food, health, water and sanitation? The concern 
is that produce sold by men may then see them spend the money on things other than the basic needs 
of the household, at worst drinking and gambling away precious funds. The dangers are greatest when 
incomes from sales come in large lumps, exacerbating the temptation to spend unwisely. The Mumias 
sugar cane scheme in western Kenya began by paying its contracted smallholder growers an annual 
sum, but then changed this to smaller, more frequent payments to avoid this danger.
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Figure 2.5  |  Share of area sown to food crops, Ethiopia and Malawi
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Not much readily available evidence exists on the propensity of commercialised small farmers to spend 
additional funds on non-essentials. Reports from the 1980s on the marginal spending of small farmers 
in Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal and Zambia, however, show that more than half of additional income was 
likely to be spent on food and drink. More detailed breakdowns for Burkina Faso show that most of the food 
spending, and more than half of all marginal spending, was on cereals (Delgado et al. 1998). While this is 
reassuring, the evidence is thin. 
Does commercial farming raise workloads to the detriment of child care? Producing commercial crops 
and livestock on small farms nearly always raises the total amount of labour used. However, that does not 
necessarily mean that members of the households work longer or harder: hired labour may take the strain, 
and indeed, the additional income may encourage some households to take some gains by substituting hired 
hands for their own labour in the fields. If, however, there is additional work by households’ members, and if 
this falls to women, then there are concerns that children may lose out. 
This has been a persistent problem in northern Zambia, where women are expected to take care of children, 
but also to do much of the farming of food gardens; a problem exacerbated in the past by the men 
migrating to work in the copper mines, so that many households have been headed by females with little 
male labour to help. In the 1940s it was observed that meals were infrequently prepared, to the detriment of 
young children who need frequent meals. Maize commercialisation, even with oxen, in the 1970s and 1980s 
used more female labour. Studies showed increased child malnourishment with commercialisation, despite 
households having more staples of all kinds. The most likely explanation was lack of female labour to 
prepare food and especially weaning foods (Moore and Vaughan 1987).
Gillespie and Mason (1991) report studies, mainly from the 1980s, where mothers’ work did affect the 
nutrition of infants in the Philippines, Kerala and south India; but results were qualified by the usually 
positive impact of additional earnings by mothers. In some cases, it was seasonality that mattered: for 
example, when demands for planting crops coincided with higher incidence of disease to which infants were 
particularly vulnerable. 
A more recent study from rural Nepal reports that preschool children were less likely to get care from 
mothers working on cash crops when there was only one child: but when there was more than one child, 
field work did not detract from child care. Reasons for this surprising outcome included the stronger demand 
on mothers’ time from multiple children, plus the likelihood that mothers with several children would have 
received more education and training (Paolisso et al. 2001).
The relation between farm work by mothers and child care thus appears neither straightforward nor direct, 
and may be mediated by a wide range of factors. 
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Apart from studies of pathways, there are overall assessments of the impacts of cash cropping on 
nutrition. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
carried out surveys to investigate the links between commercialisation and nutrition in the Gambia, 
Guatemala, Kenya, the Philippines and Rwanda. This was complemented by reviews from India, Malawi, 
Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone and Zambia. The key findings from these studies (see the synthesis 
by von Braun 1995) were:
 ● Generally smaller farms participated less in commercialisation schemes, but when they did their degree 
of participation was often higher than larger farms;
 ● In most cases, commercialisation increased staple food crop production either by bringing in new land or 
by increasing yields;
 ● Generally returns to land and labour under new crops were higher than for the staples;
 ● Commercialisation usually meant more work in the fields with corresponding increases in the use of 
hired labour. In some cases it also meant more off-farm work as well. Much of the work on commercial 
enterprises was carried out by men;
 ● Income increased in most cases for participants, whilst the demand for hired labour often spread the 
benefits of increased output. Total household income increased by a much lower percentage than the 
increase in crop income, given the importance of off-farm earnings for most households; and,
 ● In almost all cases higher income meant better child nutrition, although the relationship was quite 
weak. However, there was little evidence, other than for Sierra Leone, of nutrition getting worse under 
commercialisation. 
Thus, commercialisation does not usually impair food security and nutrition; but increased farm incomes 
usually have only a small effect on nutrition.
These findings were confirmed and qualified by DeWalt’s (1993) review of these and similar studies. 
She concluded that: 
First, the income effects of shifts to cash cropping are highly dependent on pricing policy for cash crops. 
Short term gains seen in some schemes are often highly dependent on the maintenance of high prices for 
commercial crops. 
Second, those schemes in which subsistence production is protected or stabilized are more likely to show 
positive results with an increase in income generated from cash cropping. 
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Third, increased income does not translate directly into increased food consumption at either the household 
or individual (child) level. Shifts in control of income from women to men are important. 
Fourth, morbidity, especially from diarrheal disease, is an important predictor of child growth. A failure to 
improve morbidity of children may offset gains in food consumption and in some instances a decrease in 
the time women have to care for their children as a result of commercialisation has resulted in greater 
morbidity among children. 
It is thus not whether crops or enterprises are for subsistence or sale that matters, but rather access to land, 
women’s control over produce and income, and prices for cash crops and food.  
In summary, more market engagement by smallholders should lead to higher incomes both for those engaging 
and for others living locally through linkages. Poverty should thus fall, with effects likely to be stronger the 
more that commercialisation increases the demand for labour on fields and through linkages — and even 
more if commercialising smallholder households withdraw from seeking work off their own farms. Market 
engagement should thus lead to more food security, through the income effect in particular; but the link to 
better nutrition is much weaker, since nutrition depends on care and health as much as it does to access to 
food. It also depends on how much control over household budgets women have. If commercialisation can be 
combined with efforts to improve care and health, the effect on nutrition can be strongly positive. 
2.2 CURRENT ENGAGEMENT WITH MARKETS
Most small farmers in Africa regularly engage with markets, most frequently as consumers, often buying 
in food and not just higher-value complementary foods: many smallholders are net buyers of staples as 
well (Barrett 2008, Jayne et al. 2011). That said their engagement with markets as producers is limited. For 
example, the fraction selling staple grains in Eastern and Southern Africa is typically between one quarter 
and one third of smallholders, as indicated by surveys in several countries, see Table 2.1. 
Smaller fractions still may be buying in external inputs, such as improved seed, fertiliser and farm chemicals. 
Fertiliser use in Africa is low, with most estimates reporting an average of 12kg per hectare applied or less, 
compared to more than 100kg per hectare for other parts of the developing world5 (Crawford et al. 2006, 
Minot 2009). Application rates vary considerably by country, by region within countries, and by crop. Statistics 
on the fraction of farmers using any fertiliser are cited for some farm surveys, but rarely for large areas. 
Outside some of the higher potential areas where intensive cultivation takes place, such as the central 
highlands of Kenya, and leaving aside some cash crops, such as cotton where there are well established 
means to distribute fertiliser, it can be reasonably confidently said that the majority of smallholders use very 
little, if any, manufactured fertiliser. 
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Table 2.1  |  Staple foodgrains market participation in Eastern and 
Southern Africa
source: table 1 from barrett 2008
COUNTRY CROP YEAR % SELLERS
(G=GROSS, N=NET)
STUDY
Ethiopia Maize and teff
Barley
Maize
Sorghum
Teff
Wheat
1996
1999
2000
25 n
10 g
23 g
11 g
20 g
12 g
Jayne et al. (2006)
Levinsohn and Macmillan 
(forthcoming)
(rural households only)
Kenya Maize 1997
1998
1999
2000
29 n
34 n
39 n
30 n
Nyoro et al. (1999)
Renkow et al. (2004)
Jayne et al. (2006)
Madagascar Rice 1990
2001
32 g
25 n
Barrett and Dorosh (1996)
Renkow et al. (2004)
Jayne et al. (2006)
Mozambique Basic food
Maize
Maize
Rice
1996-1997
2001-2002
2005
2002
14 g
30 g
16 g
43 n
Heltberg and Tarp (2002)
Boughton et al. (2007)
Tschirley and Abdula (2007)
Rwanda Beans
Sorghum
1986-1987 22 n
24 n
Weber et al. (1988)
Somalia Maize 1986-1987 39 n Weber et al. (1988)
Tanzania Food 2003 33 n Sarris et al. (2006)
Zambia Maize 2000 26 n Jayne et al. (2006)
Zimbabwe Maize
Grains
1984-1985
1996
45 n
27 g
Weber et al. (1988)
Govereh and Jayne (2003)
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Even less engagement takes place with financial services. Farm surveys often report less than one in ten 
small-scale farmers getting a formal loan from a bank or other financial agency.6 (Jessop et al. 2012) It 
is rare for farm households to be able to insure formally through an insurance policy against the risks in 
farming, or more generally. 
COMPETING EXPLANATIONS
Markets potentially offer small farmers the opportunity to specialise in production and realise the gains 
from comparative advantages that they may have in production. They are also the source for many external 
inputs that embody technical advances that can increase productivity. So why are many smallholders so 
little engaged in markets? At least four sets of factors may explain this. 
Technology, knowledge, underlying economics and transport costs. The first set of possibilities is that 
it simply does not make technical or economic sense to engage more with markets. Technical packages 
for farmers developed by research systems may not be as appropriate to field conditions as agronomists 
believe based on research stations plots. Compared to what was seen under controlled trials, in the 
fields yields may be lower, vulnerability to pests and diseases greater, labour demands higher, and food 
produced from improved varieties may be less tasty, less easy to process, cook and store than existing 
varieties. (Anderson 1992)
In some cases innovations may not be known, or taken as credible, by most farmers. While farmers 
sometimes learn from successful neighbours about techniques, as seen for pineapples in southern Ghana 
(Conley and Udry 2010), in other cases, such as maize in western Kenya, no such learning from neighbours 
was observed (Duflo, Kremer and Robinson 2008). 
Low use of external inputs may simply reflect the underlying economics of particular farming systems. For 
example, in areas with low population density soil fertility can be maintained through fallowing at low cost, 
rather than by applying mineral fertilisers (Boserup 1964, Ruthenberg 1980). Mechanisation may not fit the 
farming system (Pingali et al 1987).
High transport costs can change the ratio of benefits to costs at the farm gate: high unit costs raise the cost 
of inputs and depress the value of outputs when considered at the farm-gate. Transport costs in some parts 
of Africa are notably higher than in other comparable areas of the world (Livingston et al. 2011), in part owing 
to cartels amongst transport operators and informal costs of passing through border controls and internal 
barriers along highways.7 
Economic instability, risk and insecure property rights. A second explanation is that the conditions for 
investing and innovating are not stable enough (Jayne et al. 2002): that frequent shifts in government policy 
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on matters such as trade, storage and movement of grains, and price controls deters investment. Poorly-
managed macro-economies may mean inflation or sudden strong shifts in exchange rates that make it 
difficult to plan for business. In some cases fears of expropriation may be plausible: these may not apply to 
smallholders, but may affect private firms, especially when foreign-owned, contemplating investments in 
supply chains that engage smallholders. 
Risks may also be a deterrent to buying inputs: if crops fail owing to bad weather, the additional loss of 
scarce cash spent on inputs may be too high to bear. Seldom do smallholders have access to formal 
insurance against these risks. Risk aversion, with limited informal insurance — Kazianga and Udry (1996) 
were surprised how little was available in villages in Burkina Faso — can lead to profitable options being 
foregone. Drought-resistant crops may be sown in place of crops with returns that have higher means but 
higher variance; or else farmers are reluctant to spend on inputs such as improved seed and fertiliser that 
would be lost in the event of a drought. For example, Dercon and Christiaensen (2011) found that farmers 
across Ethiopia restricted their use of fertiliser on account of the risk of low food consumption in the 
event of poor weather. 
Insecure property rights could deter investment since farmers cannot be sure of a return on their spending, 
or because absence of formal title prevents land being pledged as collateral against bank loans. The large 
literature on security of tenure in rural Africa produces contrasting reports of the degree of security and its 
impact on innovation and investment. Some see little relation: for example, Besley 1995 on Ghana; Brasselle, 
Gaspart and Platteau 2002 on Burkina Faso; and Place and Otsuka (2002) on Uganda. In contrast Goldstein 
and Udry (2008) report under-use of fallowing in southern Ghana owing to fears that rights to land not 
actively farmed may be lost; while farmers in Uganda have invested more on the plots they own compared 
to those for which they have only the right to occupy (Deininger and Ali 2008). Given the subtle gradations 
in land rights under collective and longstanding arrangements and the implied degree of security, it is 
perhaps not surprising that differing outcomes should be observed in different locations and times.
Failures in markets arising from high costs of information. Markets work best when participants have ready 
access to information on prices, volumes and characteristics of products, and about other participants. In 
reality, getting this information can be difficult and costly. Costs, called ‘transaction costs’, include those 
incurred in gaining information prior to making deals, in negotiating contracts and in monitoring and policing 
the implementation of contracts. While they can be minimal when standard goods are traded in spot 
markets, they can be substantial when transactions are deferred in time, the attributes of produce can be 
difficult to inspect, and when those trading lack information. (See Douma and Schreuder 1998, North 1989, 
Williamson 1996 for the theory).  
These conditions, however, often apply for finance and inputs, and sometimes for marketed output. Bankers 
offering farm credit, a deferred transaction, need to know both the competence and the character of 
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farmers. When the latter are smallholders without bank accounts or a credit record, finding this out can be 
costly. Banks typically pass on these costs to smallholders, by demanding references and documentation 
that either cannot be met or else only at high costs to the potential borrower.8 Similarly, for a rural trader, 
selling improved seed means stocking a product for which demand is hard to judge, while for farmers the 
key characteristics of the seed — germination percentage and performance in their fields — are largely 
unknown, at least for the first time they consider buying. Overcoming the ignorance of dealers about the 
farmers, and the latter about the seed, is costly. Similar information problems apply when buyers of produce 
want ‘credence characteristics’ such as assurance on methods of production — for example, care in use of 
pesticides, no use of child labour, etc. — that cannot be observed by inspecting the produce. 
High transactions costs mean that fewer inputs are bought, less credit offered and less produce marketed 
than would be indicated by the underlying economics.9 Moreover, as Omamo (2003) proposes, the 
conditions tend then to lock in: when inputs are costly and few are sold, then input dealers cannot generate 
economies of scale; when little credit is on offer, credit histories are not created; so that information remains 
costly, transaction costs are high, and investments are correspondingly depressed. 
Some see these failures as so severe as to constitute poverty traps: if small farmers are too poor to afford to 
buy inputs needed to increase their production, and cannot obtain credit to overcome their lack of liquidity, 
then they cannot raise production and remain poor, even when the technical means to produce more are 
known (Sachs et al. 2004, Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC) 2008).
A further potential problem from lack of information arises with some investments in agricultural supply 
chains. Processors, wholesalers and retailers will only invest in processing plants and storage if they can 
be sure they can obtain supplies from farmers: farmers will only produce surpluses if they can be sure that 
these will be bought — with both parties needing additional reassurance that prices will not turn against 
them as one side or the other uses market power to extract a rent. Such assurances can be difficult to 
create when would-be investors know little about farmers, and when the farmers for their part know little 
about the potential investors. These co-ordination failures could thus significantly depress investment in 
agricultural supply chains. (Kydd 2002, Poulton et al. 2006)
Some studies have tried to estimate just how large transactions costs may be. An exception is Renkow et al. 
(2001) who estimate that for Kenyan maize farmers, transactions costs may be equivalent to a 28% tax on 
prices. Transactions costs rise with distance from markets, from 19% at one kilometre from a principal market 
to 58% at 48 kilometres distance. In Peru, Escobal (1999) estimated these costs as depressing prices by 36% 
and sales by 13% for potato farmers. 
Perhaps the single most detailed exploration of these market failures appears in Dorward, Kydd and Poulton 
(1998) who report cases of cotton growers in northern Ghana and Sindh, Pakistan, and of cashew farmers 
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from southern Tanzania. These cases present compelling accounts of the ways in which high costs of 
information can lead to under-investment in otherwise profitable opportunities. In the case of Sindh, the 
example shows that when trust can be developed, and informal institutions can regulate behaviour, these 
costs can fall to the benefit of all concerned. 
Monopoly power in rural markets. It is frequently alleged that local traders, input dealers and informal 
lenders have the power to extract rents (unearned profits) by charging higher prices owing to lack of 
competition in the market. Barrett (2008), for example, reviewing the participation of small farmers in 
markets in eastern and southern Africa found several reports of imperfect competition, including amongst 
traders in rice in Madagascar and in grains in Ethiopia. The latter study reported that farmer prices were 
thereby just 3% below what might be expected: so this is hardly a case of hard gouging.
Whether traders have the power to set prices depends in large part on them having a local monopoly. 
Barrett (2008) reports that in Madagascar farmers have not had much choice of trader to sell to:
Thus, Bernier and Dorosh (1993) found that only 29% of rice farmers in Madagascar had access to more 
than one crop buyer and outside the central highlands – home to the nation’s best infrastructure – that 
figure fell to only 6%. Barrett (1997) similarly finds that in spite of massive entry into low entry cost 
niches of food marketing channels post-liberalization in Madagascar, high entry costs into wholesaling, 
interregional transport and interseasonal crop storage sharply limit competition and boost intermediary 
profits in those functions. 
In marked contrast, others cite more recent evidence of many traders looking for produce in East Africa:
Recent large-scale survey evidence and farmer focus group discussions from the region (Kenya, Zambia, 
Malawi, Mozambique) reveals that even in the most inaccessible areas, smallholders cite numerous 
traders visiting their villages during the 4-5 months after harvest to buy surplus grain. (Jayne et al. 2011)
Evidence of the exercise of monopoly power is, however, surprisingly limited. Barrett (2008) admits that 
widespread imperfect competition is a ‘hypothesis subjected to surprisingly little empirical testing in rural 
Africa’. Those who see intermediaries as exploiting their position typically cite large margins between 
prices paid to farmers and retail prices charged to consumers. Such differences are easy to see, but the 
costs of marketing are less visible; costs that arise in transport, storage, credit and payment of taxes 
formal and informal (bribes) when moving produce. Moreover, risks that traders run when information is 
scarce can be underestimated: few notice when a trader makes a long but wasted journey to find produce 
that is not there, or when the (uncertain) price received in the central market turns out to be less than 
that paid in the village. Hence, the relatively few studies of margins in marketing chains sometimes report 
surprisingly competitive outcomes, with margins net of costs offering a modest return on working capital. 
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For example, net margins earned by traders in Benin and Madagascar were estimated at medians of 8% 
and 11% respectively by Fafchamps et al. (2003). 
In a large continent, it is likely that each of these four possible explanations accounts for some of the 
low market involvement by smallholders at some place and time, to varying degrees and combinations. 
It is however, disconcerting to find such a range of explanations, with no clear way to assess the 
strengths and prevalence of the different problems, since the indicated policy responses are rather 
different. On the other hand, there are probably complementarities and synergies amongst measures to 
deal with these different potential problems. 
BOX 2.1 KENYA TEA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY: AN UNUSUALLY SUCCESSFUL PARASTATAL 
The Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) was established in 1964 as a parastatal responsible for fostering 
small-scale tea growers. It was fully liberalised in 2002, becoming a private company owned wholly and 
exclusively by smallholders. KTDA farmers produce the lions’ share of Kenyan tea: in 2002 they farmed 71% of 
Kenya’s tea growing area.
KTDA provides farmers with key links: helping them with credit; access to better technology, such as changing 
propagation from seedlings to substantially lower-cost cuttings; implementing more labour-intensive quality 
requirements, such as harvesting two leaves and a bud as opposed to four leaves which helped position Kenyan tea 
as high-quality; and ensuring a regular cash flow for members.
Kenyan tea production increased from some 20,000 tonnes in 1964 to 400,000 tonnes in the 2000s, while 
average yields grew from one tonne per hectare in the mid-1970s to over two tonnes from the mid-1990s. From 
1961 to 2009 exports grew at an annual average rate of 6.4%, so that by the mid-1990s Kenya became the world’s 
largest tea exporter.
Smallholder farmer representation on the KTDA board from early on was key to its success. Nonetheless, inclusion 
of the smallest farmers was only ensured by defying the original rules, as the Authority first argued that farmers 
with less than 0.8 hectare were too poor to be helped. Some small growers planted tea illegally, or relied on friends 
and relatives to buy plants on credit, aided by KTDA field officers who did not enforce the rules. By the 1970s, more 
illegal than legal farmers existed so KTDA granted an amnesty and re-absorbed the smallest farmers. 
Twenty years later, the government ensured that privatisation of KTDA would benefit smallholders. Instead of 
allowing a competitive bidding process or publicly floating shares, as in previous privatisations of state-owned 
enterprises, the government restricted sale of KTDA shares to smallholder tea growers only. 
KTDA has been a considerable success, first as a public company, and now a farmer-owned entity. Protected against 
political interference, the early director of the KTDA was able to keep a sharp focus on technical competence. It 
helped that Kenya has excellent conditions for tea, but devising an organisation to co-ordinate the production and 
processing of a demanding crop has been no mean feat.
source: see appendix c for more details and sources
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Finding ways to correct market failures, however, divides opinion. On the one hand are those who 
recommend that governments intervene in rural markets to provide inputs, finance and marketing 
directly to overcome the difficulties in private provision. This was the logic that underpinned the old 
marketing boards and public enterprises that were common in Africa before the era of structural 
adjustment and liberalisation. Those boards typically supplied farmers with inputs on credit, gave 
technical advice and then bought up crops after harvest at a guaranteed price. However, they were often 
inefficient and costly, sometimes corrupt, running up very large overdrafts with the central banks. They 
came under the spotlight when structural adjustment programmes were designed: given their costs, 
many were abolished, privatised, or had their remits severely trimmed. There were exceptions, of which 
the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) is the most notable in being run effectively and efficiently, 
stimulating production from smallholders, and presiding over a remarkable growth in Kenya’s tea 
industry — see Box 2.1.
Others, alarmed that a return to direct state action might lead to the problems seen before, look to private 
and collective innovations in institutional arrangements to mitigate these problems — through devices such 
as contract farming and farmer associations. The discussion now turns to these attempts to forge new 
arrangements, to innovate institutionally.
2.3 IMPROVING THE FUNCTIONING OF RURAL MARKETS THROUGH  
INNOVATIVE INSTITUTIONS
Studies of institutional innovations can be divided into two groups: those that examine the functioning of 
specific innovations, such as contract farming, farmer cooperatives and certification; and those that evaluate 
particular experiences to improve the functioning of supply and value-chains where one or more institutional 
innovation may apply. Here we begin with the specific elements, then move to the assessments of cases.
SPECIFIC FORMS OF LINKAGE
Enterprises in supply chains can coordinate their activities in various ways. An early insight came from 
Coase (1937, cited in Douma and Schreuder 1998) who looked at the transaction costs in discovering 
prices and arriving at contracts. When these costs are high, he argued, markets may not be the best way 
to coordinate activity, but instead it may be better to coordinate activity by forming single, hierarchical 
organisations where commands replace market transactions. This insight was subsequently developed 
by Oliver Williamson (1975 and 1985, cited in Douma and Schreuder 1998, and Williamson 1996) who 
recognised that decisions will never be informed by perfect information (‘bounded rationality’) and 
that opportunism (‘moral hazard’) can be a threat in transactions when one party has more information 
than the other (‘asymmetric information’). He identified three dimensions that affect transactions: asset 
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specificity, that is whether one party has invested in physical or human assets that have no alternative 
use in another activity — for example, a cotton gin; the degree of uncertainty or risk that applies in 
production and markets; and, the frequency of transactions. Depending on the conformations of these 
three dimensions, the most effective form of link would lie along a spectrum from spot deals at one end 
through forms of contracting and interlinked deals to vertically integrated operations at the other end. 
Running from the most to least flexible arrangements, these would comprise:
 ● Spot market deals, one-off transactions in markets;
 ● Repeated deals in markets, between people who regularly trade with one another, with tacit 
understanding that there would be future transactions;
 ● Contracts from buyers to suppliers to deliver a specified product and quantity for an agreed price in 
advance;
 ● Interlinked contracts where in addition to agreement on sales, the buyer also supplies inputs, finance, 
technical assistance in advance to the supplier on the promise of sales with costs of these deducted 
from payment; and,
 ● Vertically-integrated operations, such as when a processor operates a plantation directly growing the 
produce for processing.
Of these, the arrangement that has attracted most attention is contract farming, and especially the 
second form, where contracts in produce are linked to deals in inputs and other services. It is easy to see 
why: if rural markets offer smallholders only limited amounts of inputs, finance and technical assistance, 
and often at high prices, then arrangements that remedy the often severe shortages of finance and inputs 
can potentially be most valuable. 
Interlinked deals are seen in other arrangements, most notably share-cropping where landlords advance 
inputs to tenants in return for a share of the harvest. In the 1960s and 1970s, share-cropping was often 
seen as an inefficient arrangement since tenants working the land would tend to under-invest in inputs 
if they did not get the full harvest as a reward. However, that judgment was reassessed in the light of 
market imperfections, by which the tenants would not otherwise get access to working capital, and might 
additionally find the risks of investing in inputs when harvests vary too heavy to bear. (Bardhan 1989)
CONTRACT FARMING
To illustrate the possibilities of contracting, here are two examples. In Madagascar, Lecofruit exports mainly 
hand-picked French beans to Europe, mostly processed in jars. It obtains the beans from more than 9,000 
small-scale vegetable farmers. The company advances seed, fertiliser and pesticide to farmers, and employs 
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an extension agent for every 25 to 30 growers to help them meet the high quality standards and food safety 
requirements demanded by European supermarkets.
Contracted farmers tend to be better educated than the average Malagasy household, having often completed 
primary schooling, but they are otherwise small farmers with a hectare or less of land. Each contract is 
restricted to one hundredth of a hectare, but given relatively short production cycles there can be several on 
the same plot over the course of the year, while different household members may have their own contracts. 
Even so, it is rare for households to have more than five hundredths of a hectare planted to green beans. 
The scheme benefits the households by increasing incomes, as well as making them more reliable, so that 
participating households face a shorter lean season. (Minten et al. 2011)
In Senegal, since 1990 a private firm contracts 32,000 farmers to produce confectionary peanuts (Arachide 
de Bouche) most of which are exported, mainly to the European Union (EU). The company provides 
contracted growers with seeds, fertiliser and agro-chemicals for one hectare plots, and closely supervises 
farmer performance through extension agents. 
Contracting farmers’ incomes significantly increased, not only raising the standard of living of growers, but 
also creating additional jobs in the local economy through multipliers. It seems that farmers were selected 
on merit for the scheme, with no bias towards the larger farmers in the villages (Warning and Key 2002).
These and other reviews (see Barrett et al. 2012, Oya 2012, Prowse 2012) suggest that successful 
contracting depends on:
 ● There being a good business opportunity that allows processors to make money while being able to pay 
farmers an attractive price. The opportunity, of course, needs to be one that neither party could easily 
seize without the participation of the other;
 ● Both parties are committed to the contract. It helps if farmers cannot sell on the side and thereby avoid 
repayment of input costs. For contracting processors or traders, it helps if supplies from smallholders 
are essential to their business: if they can get supplies from large farms or the spot market, there may be 
temptations to default when the market prices falls well below the contracted price — even if inputs have 
been advanced to contracted farmers. That leads to the next point; 
 ● When contracts include a guaranteed or fixed price for the produce, it helps if the market is reasonably 
stable and the promised price is in line with the spot market. If the agreed price is a long way from that 
on offer in the market at time of produce delivery, either farmers or processors may be tempted to 
default. The existence of a signed agreement often counts for little in such cases: taking the defaulting 
party to arbitration or court is often costly, with little chance of getting commensurate compensation.
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In the right circumstances, then, contracting can work well for both parties. Yet it seems that most 
smallholders in Africa are neither part of such schemes, nor have they had the chance to join one. 
However, if contracts can resolve the pervasive issues of lack of access to inputs, working capital, 
technology and marketing, then why are there not more schemes? The answer presumably lies in the 
quite demanding conditions for successful contracting: they tend to apply only when a processor has 
some monopsony power, that derives either from the crop needing processing that is beyond the means 
of farmers and most businesses as well — think of a typical sugar mill, where there is a high threshold 
for reaching the scale necessary for volume economies; or from know-how in marketing that allows the 
contractor to access a premium market. 
In many cases, crops and products can be processed and marketed on small-scale by all and sundry, so 
processors rarely have a monopsony, and can in any case get the supplies they need from farmers in 
spot markets. After all, for the processors, there is no point in setting up a contract if business can be 
done without this. 
However, we know too little about contracting, above all the dynamics of contracting, since so many studies 
are snapshots in time. Moreover, the cases that are documented are not random samples, since selection 
bias applies: the schemes that are documented are almost inevitably those that survive, with failed schemes 
being unobservable and usually undocumented. Further biases apply when looking at the impacts on 
farmers, since contracting firms tend to pick out the more favoured areas and the better resourced farmers 
within them. These farms and locations would probably be doing well whether or not a contract scheme 
operated (Barrett et al. 2012, Prowse 2012).
FARMER ASSOCIATIONS AND COOPERATIVES
If transactions costs are high for individual smallholders when dealing with other actors in supply and value-
chains, then forming groups of farmers so they can aggregate sales, input purchase, loans and technical 
assistance might be one response. Not only do these promise to economise on transactions costs, but also 
they should give the group greater bargaining power, especially when facing those with monopoly power. 
They can also be a means by which farmers make their voice heard within policy-making. 
Promise aside, experiences of farmer associations and cooperatives have been mixed. Too often, they have 
failed owing to the lack of competence or honesty of their managers, often in collusion with leaders of the 
cooperatives. Some cooperatives have largely become vehicles for the political ambitions of their leaders, 
with services to members being neglected. 
Political considerations aside, theories about cooperatives can be useful to understand the conditions under 
which they may be successful. Johnston and Clark (1982) set out a simple benefit and cost framework. This states 
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that cooperatives will only function if cooperation delivers benefits that could not be gained by individual effort 
alone (Curtis 1991); and if the (transactions) costs of cooperation are commensurately smaller than the expected 
gains. Costs of cooperation rise when membership is wide and diverse, when the aims of collective action 
multiply, and when it is difficult for members to appreciate how much others contribute to and receive from the 
cooperative. This helps explain the failures of many cooperatives set up in rural Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. 
They often had broad membership with everyone in the community registered, had multiple goals including not 
just production but also welfare provisions, resulting in complicated administration that made the cooperatives 
hard to manage, while members found it difficult to appreciate the contributions and rewards of other members.10
A recent review of farmer collective action in Africa (Shiferaw et al. 2011) confirms these ideas, success being 
found when: 
‘… farmers can manage them autonomously with minimal government interference; farmers participate 
actively in decision-making at every stage of the process; and their cooperative activities are profitable’. 
Good practice observed includes serving higher value markets where smallholders do not compete with 
large farms, providing benefits that members value and that cannot be obtained without belonging, setting 
clear procedures, and using professional management, but without inflating costs unduly. They warn against 
farmer organisations replacing private enterprise, instead arguing that collective action should include those 
activities for which the association has competitive advantages, then beyond those, link to private firms. 
Process matters as well: they cite Chirwa et al. (2005) in proposing that: 
‘… producer groups exercise caution in the process – first, building business skills and learning to be 
effective, second, being efficient and profitable, and third, learning to expand the scale and scope of 
their enterprise to exploit economies of scale.’ 
Others similarly counsel against over-burdening young organisations with too many functions, or exacting 
functions; while building capacity from local structures rather than by imposing models (Biénabe and Sautier 
2005, Best et al. 2005).
REVIEWS AND EVALUATIONS OF PROGRAMMES TO LINK FARMERS TO MARKETS
In the last five years or so, there has been a surge in interest in the possibilities of improving the links 
of smallholders to markets across the developing world, and in Africa in particular. Ever since structural 
adjustment and liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s saw the state retreat from active engagement 
in markets, some donors — the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) being 
prominent — and NGOs have actively tried to stimulate and support both farmers and the institutional 
arrangements that have emerged. 
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At the same time, private interests in developing better links to smallholders have been stimulated by 
the rapid increase in shares of food sales through supermarkets in some developing countries. For Latin 
America, East and Southeast Asia estimates show supermarkets selling half or more of all food sold, up 
from negligible shares in the early 1990s (Reardon et al. 2009, Traill 2006). This advance may be less 
prominent in Africa, but nevertheless supermarket chains are emerging as significant suppliers of food 
to urban middle classes. 
A further inspiration has been the possibility of exporting to high value and premium markets in Europe 
and North America. This includes not only air-freighted fruit, flowers and vegetables, but also the emerging 
markets for food certified as organic or fairly traded. The premium prices paid for these products have 
prompted efforts to source them from smallholders. 
The spike in prices of cereals on world markets in 2007–08 has added interest in the supply of food and the 
potential of smallholders to supply more. Those groups who were studying links before the spike have been 
all the more stimulated to publish their findings. 
While only some of the experience of governments, donors, NGOs and private companies to link to 
smallholders has been documented in any detail or depth, more than a dozen significant reviews11 of these 
efforts have been published in the last five years, many of them since 2010. Most of these studies review 
a limited number of cases — rarely more than twenty — of linking smallholders to a particular market, 
typically analysing them by a value-chains approach.12 They usually study the scope and conditions for 
small farmers to participate in supply chains that pay premium prices, which farmers are able to participate, 
and what benefits they obtain. Many have a practical objective: they aim to find practical lessons and policy 
implications from their analyses. 
The overall lessons from these studies are remarkably similar on many points, with the following six being 
prominent:
1.  Export markets, especially those for high value and niche products, are options limited to only some 
smallholders, they may be excessively demanding for many farmers and they may be risky as well. 
For the small farmers, the major risk component in the family farming activities (illness, pest 
and diseases, drought), managed by existing systems based on farmers’ social networks are not 
adequate to face supplementary marketing risks (shift in supply and demand, product perishability, 
length of supply chain, process complexity, uncertainty in governmental policy making and practice). 
(Biénabe et al. 2004)
Hence look first and foremost to the domestic and regional markets that are large, expanding, probably 
more stable and less demanding for the characteristics of produce delivered. 
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Some reviews criticise (some) donors for having focused too much on the high-value export markets, 
arguing that the cost of certification has often been too high, and the risks involved are too high. (Jaffee 
et al. 2011). Supermarkets will source their supplies from small farmers, but only when they cannot get 
supplies from larger farms, sometimes when farmers have invested in essential assets such as cooling 
tanks for milk, and often when farmers are organised in groups. 
One very recent study (Vorley et al. 2012) argues that for the vast majority of smallholders in the 
developing world, their links to markets are informal. The authors worry that too much attention to the 
new and more sophisticated chains of exporters and processors will causes policy-makers to lose sight 
of the importance of informality and the fate of smallholders who depend on those links. 
2.  Focus on business aims of realising returns to investments, whether on farms or in the supply chains. 
Beware of other aims or instruments that may detract from this, above all social objectives of including 
poor farmers in some of the more demanding linkages observed. Successful links can be made to 
smallholders, but not necessarily to the very poorest of them.
3. Small-scale farmers usually need to be grouped when dealing with processors, traders and exporters, 
to overcome the high costs of transacting with atomised producers. The costs of cooperation are real, 
however, while the ability of farmers — at least initially — to organise and manage collective efforts 
are usually limited. There may well be trade-offs between forming groups that function effectively 
since members are reasonably homogeneous and have the resources to co-operate; versus trying to 
include some of the poorer and more vulnerable members of the community. One way of making 
such groups more inclusive may be allowing some members to participate to a lesser degree than 
others, but with fewer rights. This, of course, breaks with longstanding principles of cooperatives, 
whereby all members are equal. 
The least successful types of organization are those that were imposed from outside and based upon 
donor-driven criteria (for example, size, organizational rules, membership rules) which do not resonate 
locally, have limited internal capacity and very broad and ill-defined objectives. More successful 
results were observed from horizontal organizations which have strict entry requirements and were 
created by local entrepreneurs to address a specific need. (Mitchell and Coles 2011)
4. While producer organisations can reduce transactions costs and give farmers power when interacting 
with large firms in the supply chain, beware of trying to replace existing private sector functions by 
collective action — unless, of course, it is clear that the replaced functions are ineffective, inefficient or 
grossly unfair. Tempting as it may be to assume that cooperation can give farmers better services, higher 
prices for outputs and cheaper inputs, the reality is that they often cannot, since the private operators 
are currently often working reasonably well given the circumstances. 
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5. Supply chains may be more effective and efficient when some agency acts as a champion, taking the 
initiative in brokering new arrangements, overseeing changes and resolving problems. This is often 
a dominant processor, wholesaler or exporter with some degree of market power; but it may be an 
NGO, government body or donor project. Champions often take risks and invest in new arrangements: 
private sector firms will usually only do this if there is some commensurate reward for the effort, so 
this will usually only occur when there is a business opportunity. Champions, of course, have some 
market power, so the challenge is to create conditions that will encourage such initiative, but without 
allowing champions to extract undue rents. In discussing this, Webber and Labaste (2011) argue for 
markets that are contestable: that is, right now there may be little competition in a market, but 
there is a credible threat of competitors entering the market that provides a discipline for current 
participants.
6. The final common theme is perhaps the single strongest refrain in these studies: the importance of 
process in building links, rather than imposing blueprints. For all the cases that are reviewed in these 
studies with their varying arrangements for linking small farmers to supply chains and markets, there 
is a striking absence of detailed discussion of these arrangements. More is usually said about the ways 
in which the arrangement has been developed and what allows it to function. Instead, these studies 
stress the importance of taking time to build links, to be flexible, and to build up local competences 
— and, correspondingly, not to impose models. Whatever arrangements are being developed, those 
engaged have to build trust between smallholders and others in the chain; and have to develop their 
competences as the arrangements develop. 
This, in turn, implies that outside agencies, and especially those in the public sector, need to take care  
not to push for too much change too quickly, whatever the temptations of targets and the need to 
disburse budgets. 
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1. Prices for 1957 converted to their value in 2007 dollars.
2. In some contract farming schemes the use of inputs supplied is 
supervised to discourage diversion. In other cases the contracting 
companies have recognised farmers’ needs and preferences and 
provided inputs for food crops in addition to the contracted crops, as 
seen in contracting of tobacco production in Malawi in the late 2000s 
(Prowse, personal communication). 
3. This makes sense: grain yields are typically 1 tonne per hectare, so that 
one hectare plot would produce enough to provision a family of 5 adult 
equivalents consuming 200kg of cereals a year. 
4. In some contract farming schemes, processors limit the area contracted 
by farmers so as to ensure that commercial production does not 
displace production for home consumption. 
5. In 2006, it was estimated that 173kg of fertiliser was applied on average 
to each hectare of temporary and permanent cropland. In Asia the 
average rate was 222kg per hectare; while in South America and the 
Middle East and North Africa, the rate was in the range from 131–138kg 
per hectare. Hernández and Torero 2011, quoting statistics from the 
World Resources Institute.
6. It is however striking that there appear to be few statistics on the 
proportion of farmers in Africa who have received a formal financial loan. 
7. Gollin and Rogerson 2010 argue that high rural transport costs can 
limit productivity on farms in Uganda. All-weather roads in rural 
Ethiopia would reduce poverty by almost 7 percentage points and raise 
consumption by more than 16 percentage points, according to estimates 
by Dercon et al. (2009). 
8. It may be coincidence, but the New Institutional Economics that expects 
high transactions costs, came to prominence shortly after more than a 
decade of research from the ‘Ohio School’ on rural credit drew attention 
to the costs of information as an explanation for failing credit markets 
(see von Pischke et al. 1983). 
9. In effect, high transaction costs effectively push supply and demand 
curves upwards, so the market equilibrium is a higher price, or less 
traded, or a combination of these.  
10. Studies of informal collective action tend to arrive at similar insights, 
stressing the importance of collectives having a tight focus on collective 
benefits, and using transparent means for taking decisions (see Wade 
1987 on village institutions in southern India). 
11. Biénabe et al. 2004; Biénabe, Berdegué and Peppelenbos 2011; 
Campbell 2010; Haggblade, et al. 2012; Jaffee, Henson and Díaz Ríos 
2011; Maatman 2011; Mitchell and Coles 2011; Shepherd 2007; Vermeulen 
and Cotula 2010; Vorley, del Pozo V. and Barnett 2012; Vorley, Lundy and 
McGregor 2008; Vorley and Proctor 2008; Webber and Labaste 2010; 
Woodhill, Guijt, Wegner and Sopov 2012
12. Haggblade et al. (2012) see value-chain approaches as being an accessible 
counterweight tool to the analytical prowess of large corporations:   
‘The business school graduates who drive corporate strategy at large 
agribusiness firms conduct proprietary market assessments that form 
the basis for internal strategic plans. Serving as a counterweight, value 
chain assessments provide open-source, countervailing analytical and 
diagnostic power on behalf of the least powerful members of global 
value chains, the rural poor.’
CHAPTER 2 ENDNOTES
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If successful cases 
are to be scaled up 
to increase reach and 
impact, a variety of 
models and processes 
must be considered.
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The cases reviewed, as well as the literature, suggest that linking smallholders to markets can be seen as 
three sets of related considerations, or dimensions, see Figure 3.1. 
One concerns the business case for those engaged in the links, including smallholders, traders, processors 
and retailers. Several factors make this possible: that the state fulfils its basic roles of ensuring an enabling 
investment climate in rural areas and provides public goods that the private sector will not; that those 
working with smallholders and their chains focus attention on the most appropriate markets, and that they 
focus efforts on priorities in particular cases, be that production on farm or marketing, be those attempts to 
maximise returns or to reduce risks. 
Another consideration is the approach of those helping make the links. Principles for linking are easy to 
state: that agencies should enable and facilitate actions by those in the chains, rather than replace them; 
and that support should be temporary, preferably with an exit strategy in place early on. Processes are 
equally clear. Learning needs to take place to overcome unforeseen obstacles. 
The third dimension is about how links are organised and how effective arrangements can be formed. 
Considerations here include the role of champions and catalysts, the way in which smallholders are grouped, 
and the particular forms of linkage. 
The three dimensions are systematically interrelated: strategic choices about markets interact with 
approaches and affect decisions made about organisation. They are also heavily embedded in circumstances, 
including the crops or livestock concerned, local geography, social formations and so on. Given the number 
of variables that potentially affect outcomes, a systems view is inevitable. It is not surprising that the 
analytical approach most often seen in use by agencies, that of value-chains, is essentially a systems view in 
which causal links run in more than one direction with feedback loops common. 
In this schema the actual forms of linkage — such as spot markets, contracts, producer organisations — 
come last of all: this reflects reviews of experience which downplay the precise form in favour of trying 
to understand functions in varying circumstances.13 This, as will be seen in the conclusions, has important 
implications when answering the important question of how to scale up small, but promising, initiatives. 
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Figure 3.1  |  Three dimensions in linking smallholders to markets
BUSINESS CASE (FOR SMALLHOLDERS AND PARTNERS IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN)
• Essential public roles include: 
• Building an enabling rural investment climate and 
• Providing rural public goods: roads, health, education, water,
 
research and extension
• When choosing a market for produce, domestic, regional markets
 
may often be better than exports
• Determine the focus for working with smallholder farmers; production
 
or marketing; maximising returns or 
reducing risk. This may change over time
ORGANISING THE LINKS
• Find champions, catalysts to make the links
• Group smallholder farmers to overcome 
diseconomies of small-scale 
• Use forms of linkage appropriate to local and 
market conditions
APPROACHES TO LINKING
• Enable and facilitate, don’t replace
• Plan for temporary support, and an exit 
strategy
• Learning and overcoming unforeseen 
obstacles will be required
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3.1 BUSINESS CASE
Unless smallholders — and others in the supply chain — see returns to their capital, labour and land that 
justify investment and innovation, then there is no case to link small-scale farmers to markets. 
… no amount of goodwill, money or effort is sufficient to develop relationships that operate against 
business models. (Mitchell and Coles 2011)
So, what affects the business case for investment? Three issues stand out from the literature and cases: 
working within an enabling economic environment, supported by rural public goods; producing for the 
most appropriate market; and, focusing on the most critical elements for farmers, be they in production or 
marketing, in maximising returns or reducing risks. 
THE PUBLIC CHALLENGE: AN ENABLING RURAL INVESTMENT CLIMATE AND PUBLIC GOODS
Farmers, traders, processors and retailers cannot prosper in markets unless the state ensures the basic 
conditions under which markets can function. Governments have to ensure that there is an enabling or 
conducive rural investment climate, and have to invest in the rural public goods that private investors will 
not provide. The combination of these encourages investment and innovation by private firms, not least of 
all, by small-scale farmers. 
Working with farmers will have little impact if the enabling environment that governments provide is 
inappropriate for development of market linkages. (Shepherd 2007)
RURAL INVESTMENT CLIMATE
What makes for an enabling rural investment climate? It is combination of peace and order; macro-
economic stability with inflation contained and a competitive exchange rate; predictable and modest 
taxation, with tax reinvested in public goods; and the recognition of basic institutions, above all property 
rights that are respected (Poulton et al. 2008). 
The elements of a good general investment climate are well known, and many of the same factors 
are equally or more important in the enabling environment for agriculture: good governance, 
macroeconomic stability, transparent and stable trade policies, effective market institutions and respect 
for property rights. (FAO 2012)
The benefits of an enabling environment are seen strongly when they are absent. In the 1970s and the first 
half of the 1980s these conditions were grossly lacking in many countries of Africa. For farmers rampant 
inflation and heavy over-valuation of the domestic currency often meant that there was no incentive 
to produce more exports, since their value in local money was low, and often there were few consumer 
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goods on offer to buy. Net rates of assistance to agriculture (NRA), a measure of the extent to which 
macroeconomic conditions and government taxes and spending favour farming, were substantially negative 
at this time, see Figure 3.2. These rates were often a lot worse for export crops that were typically heavily 
taxed, both explicitly and implicitly. For example, Ghana’s cocoa had an NRA of -0.8 or worse — that is to say 
an 80% tax — between 1976 and 1979. With little incentive to produce, cocoa production in Ghana slumped, 
while farmers who could smuggle their beans out through neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire and Togo did so.
It is easy to see the importance of the investment climate. The issue in practice, however, is how good 
does the climate have to be to allow investment, or, put otherwise, how bad can it be before investors are 
deterred? This matters: developing countries rarely have the administrative capacity, or perhaps also the 
political ability, to get an ideal investment climate. Hence there is debate about ‘good enough governance’ 
(Grindle 2004, 2007) and the minimal conditions for progress (Moore and Schmitz 2008), largely inspired by 
East Asian examples, where heavy investment and rapid economic growth have been achieved despite an 
imperfect investment climate and governance. 
China provides a lesson. The reforms that China made in 1978 in allowing farmers to work their own fields 
and to deliver part of their produce to markets rather than to state traders, were far from comprehensive, 
but these changes helped accelerate agricultural growth that not only led to reduced rural poverty, but also 
allowed the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation of China (Bromley and Yang 2006, China-DAC Study 
Group 2010, Rodrik 2003, 2004). This suggests that it is not necessary to create a perfect investment climate, 
but merely to remove the worst failings from the environment. 
Fortunately the reforms undertaken — often painfully — in many African countries in the 1980s and 1990s 
have removed the worst failings, so that the obstacles to investment are much reduced from what they were. 
While in the 1970s agriculture was on balance taxed by 15% or more, by 2005 that had been reduced to less 
than 5%, see Figure 3.2.
One of the best examples comes from Ghana, where the reforms of 1983 saw hyperinflation tamed, the Cedi 
(heavily) devalued to a competitive level, and reform of the cocoa marketing board to reduce costs and so 
raise the share of the export price received by farmers. These led to a remarkable acceleration of agricultural 
growth. For much of the decade before 1983 agricultural growth was slow or negative; since the reforms, 
agriculture has grown at an average annual rate of around 5% a year, one of the fastest of any farm sector in 
the world. (Leturque and Wiggins 2011) 
Not that it is impossible to make progress in unpromising rural investment climates, as cases of input 
distribution in Nigeria, Box 3.1, and Zimbabwe, Box 3.2 show. In these cases external assistance has seemingly 
been able to improve the supply of inputs for smallholders in otherwise unpromising conditions. 
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When poor business environments improve, of course, there can be new opportunities. Rwanda is a case 
in point. Prior to the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the coffee sector had been strongly regulated by a state 
company that controlled marketing, set prices that were uniform no matter what the quality, discouraged 
intercropping, and even prevented farmers entering or leaving coffee cultivation. Producers were taxed as the 
state coffee company was a cash cow to generate funds for leaders. When in 1996 peace was restored, the 
coffee sector was liberalised. Farmers could cultivate as they wished, sales were allowed to private traders, 
while a donor project encouraged better production and processing. Premium prices were paid for better 
beans. As a consequence Rwandan growers and traders have been seeking the higher value markets for their 
coffee, with rising average returns to the volume sold, see Figure 3.3. In some cases, relatively small parts of 
the investment climate can be improved, as was the case with the marketing of milk in Kenya, see Box 3.3.
BOX 3.1 PROPCOM NIGERIA: WORKING IN AN UNPROMISING ENVIRONMENT
Nigeria’s rural investment climate is poor. The few state-funded rural extension agents often don’t reach poor 
farmers with the necessary information or inputs, and distribution channels for fertiliser are often corrupted. The 
government procures fertiliser and is supposed to distribute it at subsidised rates to small farmers, but it does not 
do this effectively. This undermines private fertiliser sales because fertiliser companies focus their sales efforts on 
the government buyer —effectively ignoring the rest of the market. In 2008, for instance, Nigeria’s largest fertiliser 
blending plant sold 20% of its supply to the open market and 80% to the government. 
In theory, the government subsidised fertiliser should cost farmers something like 60% less than the official market 
price, but in practice it ends up costing almost the same owing to informal rules and social patronage. Furthermore, 
distribution is unreliably timed. Market fertiliser is available only in 50kg bags, which most small farmers cannot af-
ford. Sometimes traders open the bags and sell smaller amounts, but this can lead to ruined or adulterated fertiliser, 
so farmers are less willing to buy it.
Promoting Pro-Poor Opportunities in Commodity and Service Markets (PrOpCom) was a DFID-funded project that began 
in 2004 and was largely designed to address issues of fertiliser access for smallholders in Nigeria. PrOpCom refocused 
private fertiliser companies’ sales efforts on selling small, affordable packages of fertiliser directly to smallholders in 
remote areas rather than selling strictly to government buyers. The companies were also encouraged to provide farmer 
training. Village Promoters, local farmers who were trained, located across Nigeria, sell small packs (1kg) of urea and 
Nitrogen, Phosphorus and Potassium (NPK) fertiliser to farmers in their communities. They use demonstration plots to 
educate farmers on the best use of fertiliser and best farming practices. The small packages mean farmers can afford 
them individually and don’t have to buy from opened bags or coordinate with neighbours to buy larger packs together.  
By the end of the project in 2011 some 4,279 tonnes of fertiliser in small packs had been purchased by just over a 
million farmers in 25 states across Nigeria, with almost 212,000 farmers receiving training in application techniques. 
PrOpCom appears remarkably simple and effective. It corrects a failure in the government and market systems. It 
helped that demand was high and alternative supply channels were so convoluted that they provided little compe-
tition. Subsequently, fertiliser supply has been reformed in Nigeria. 
source: see appendix c for more details and sources
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In summary, the rural investment needs to be sufficiently encouraging to allow investment and innovation; 
but it does not need to be perfect — piecemeal reform can trigger significant investment.
RURAL PUBLIC GOODS
Turning to the other basic requirement from the state, government needs to invest in rural public goods: those that 
private firms will not provide since they cannot recover in revenues the costs of their investment. These include 
physical infrastructure — rural roads, electricity, perhaps large-scale irrigation and drainage where applicable:
Reliable roads, power and water supplies are vital for perishable products, agroprocessing and export of 
high-value produce (Shepherd 2007); 
BOX 3.2 ZIMBABWE AGRO-DEALERS: REVIVING A SECTOR IN ADVERSITY
The rural investment climate in Zimbabwe is relatively poor. A decade-long economic recession started in 2000, 
marked by hyperinflation and scarcity of imported goods. Agro-input supply chains collapsed. Farmers became 
used to donor hand-outs of inputs, but these further undermined local input markets. 
The Rural Agro-dealer Restocking Programme (RARP) was a scheme developed by SNV  to revive rural agro-deal-
ers who faced hurdles such as limited finance to buy from wholesalers and depressed demand because NGOS 
and the government were distributing inputs for free. 
Three key constraints were recognised at the outset of the scheme: rural agro-dealers did not have the finance to 
stock their shops; suppliers were wary of committing their cash to advance inputs to dealers without a guarantee; 
and, farmers did not get technical support from the agro-dealers. 
RARP began August 2009 as a pilot. For wholesalers of agricultural inputs, it helped develop viable business 
models and train staff to deal with small businesses, providing insurance to encourage suppliers to place consign-
ment stock in rural retail outlets. For agro-dealers, it helped train and mentor them on retail business manage-
ment. The pilot also insured them against default; although, in a fascinating detail, dealers were not told, so as to 
avoid dealers being careless in choosing customers knowing that they would be protected from default.
In the 2010/11 season the pilot was scaled up to cover the whole country, with further support from the Danish In-
ternational Development Agency (DANIDA), FAO, HELP (a German NGO), Coraid (Catholic Organisation for Relief & 
Development Aid, the Netherlands), the Netherlands Embassy and GRM International. At this stage, market-based input 
provision was seen as more sustainable than the free input hand-outs previously promoted by donors and government. 
Wholesalers were provided with insurance covering US$5,000 worth of inputs per shop, in total US$112,000 worth of in-
surance. This was sufficient to allow sales worth US$9.3M. Agro-dealers did not default on their payments for supplies. 
RARP was well-planned. It also helped that experience from other programmes, such as Agribusiness Entrepreneur 
Network and Training programme of Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), Zimbabwe (CARE’s 
AGENT programme) showed agro-dealer defaults could be low given good selection and training. Where small rural 
shops are credit constrained, particularly where there is a strong demand for their supplies, it ought to be replicable.
source: see appendix c for more details and sources
49
Investment in people through education, clean water and sanitation, and health are equally important: 
illiterate and innumerate farmers who are frequently sick14 cannot farm as well as they might. A supply 
of public knowledge through agricultural research and extension is also needed, since some important 
technical information, even if not all, is a public rather than private good. 
Spending on rural public goods pays off, as the evidence from agricultural development in Asia shows 
(Fan et al. 2000, Fan et al. 2007). While spending on public goods usually pays off, public spending 
on goods that would be provided by firms in the market (private goods) generally does not (Fan and 
Rao 2003). In Latin America, de Ferranti et al. (2005) lament that between 1985 and 2000, for nine 
countries in the region, more than 54% of public spending in rural areas was on private goods and 
transfers. They calculated that an extra 1% in the share of rural spending on public goods led to a 0.23% 
increase in farm output, compared to only a 0.06% return to increased total spending with no change in 
composition. Clearly, there are great gains to be had from switching funding from private to public goods 
in rural Latin America.
For smallholders linking to markets, transport can be a critical factor. High transport costs reduce 
prices paid to farmers for their output at the farm gate, while raising the cost of external inputs such as 
fertiliser when delivered locally. For Rwanda’s coffee farmers, transport costs from farm-gate to the port 
of Mombasa are estimated to take 80% of the producer price, with costs of transporting from farm to 
Kigali at 40% of the farmer price (Diop et al. 2005). The impacts on rural incomes and poverty reduction 
are probably high. If rural transport costs were halved, this would push up farm prices by 20%, thereby 
BOX 3.3 IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT FOR MARKETING MILK IN KENYA
Highland Kenya has good conditions for keeping dairy cows, while Nairobi and other cities have large markets 
for dairy products. 
Marketing of milk takes place in two distinct channels: one, the formal, that chills, pasteurises and packs fresh 
milk, as well as producing butter, cream, and yogurt for the middle class; the other, informal, that moves raw milk 
from farms to low income consumers — who understand that milk needs to be boiled. Roughly 80% of milk takes 
the informal route, sold at prices around half of the formal, processed milk.
Before 2004 the informal channel was illegal, outlawed by the Dairy Act. A concerted effort to promote dialogue 
between stakeholders, government and political leaders led to reform of the Act to allow small vendors of milk 
to be licensed, subject to improving the hygiene of milk handling. 
The operating costs of small-scale milk vendors have fallen, cutting the cost of milk to low income consumers.
It seems the changes have accelerated the production of milk in Kenya: before 2004 production was hovering 
around 2.6M tonnes a year, since 2010 that has increased to more than 4M tonnes a year. 
sources: see appendix c
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reducing the incidence of poverty by 6%, according to models. Furthermore, the poor would benefit more 
from lower prices than the richer rural households. (Diop et al. 2005) 
Public goods, such as transport or communications infrastructure, are critical to the development of all 
value chains. … One of the most significant interventions to limit the friction of distance between remote, 
rural producers and the market is to improve transport infrastructure. The savings in transportation costs 
achieved by these interventions accrue directly to producer households. (Mitchell and Coles 2011)
How easy is it to reduce transport costs? Costs escalate rapidly as transport moves from tarred to unmade 
roads and then to headloading, as seen in the case of moving bags of produce from villages in eastern Sierra 
Leone to the capital and port of Freetown in the mid-2000s, see Figure 3.4. Improving transport close to 
farms and villages may have high pay-offs in some cases.
It is not just operating costs that push up the price of transport: cartels and roadblocks also add their costs 
to the bill:
Transport cartels are still common across Africa, and the incentives to invest in modern trucks and 
logistics services are weak. Roadblocks, as well as being a nuisance, add considerably to the costs and 
time to transport, undermining the efficiency of transport operations. Estimates suggest that reform that 
delivers more competition could reduce the cost of transporting staples in West Africa by 50 percent 
within 10 years. A different study finds that a 50 percent reduction in transport costs in Mozambique 
would increase real agricultural GDP by seven percent and also increase agricultural GDP in Malawi by 
three percent. (World Bank 2012)
In summary, government spending on public goods in rural areas is not only necessary for farmers and other 
private entrepreneurs to conduct their business, but also the rewards more than pay for the costs.
WHAT MARKETS FOR SMALLHOLDER PRODUCE?
Understanding markets for produce is central to decisions to invest and innovate. The size and growth of the 
market, the qualities of produce demanded and potential risks, are key considerations. A strong message about 
markets emerges from the cases and literature: take care with export markets, especially for high value and 
novel products; and, correspondingly, do not overlook the growing domestic and regional markets within Africa.
EXPORTING NON-TRADITIONAL PRODUCTS: OPPORTUNITIES AND DANGERS
Export markets are attractive. They can offer much larger demand than can be found domestically or 
in neighbouring countries, and prices may be much higher than those in domestic markets, partly since 
consumers in distant markets may be prepared to pay premiums for characteristics such as organic or 
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fair-traded produce that have little value in home markets. In Africa, for the last 150 years some small-scale 
farmers have taken advantage of exporting as a vent for surplus production that could never be sold locally, 
given that until recently the continent was little urbanised and most consumers had limited budgets. 
Although Africa has lost share in some traditional exports, such as cocoa, associated with the disappointing 
growth of agriculture seen in the 1970s and 1980s, new opportunities have emerged. Air freight rates have 
been falling15 making it possible to fly perishables such as fish, flowers, fruit and vegetables to European 
markets. Farming for these high-value products has grown very rapidly in the last two decades. 
So, why sound a note of caution over export markets? Terms of access and risk are the issues. On the former, 
export markets can be highly demanding in quality and consistency, and increasingly in traceability and 
certification of production conditions and origins. 
Certification can be highly costly for smallholders: meeting Global GAP (Good Agricultural Practice) 
requirements for procedures and documentation that allows export to leading European supermarket 
chains can cost a farm US$580 (Ashraf et al. 2008, for Kenya) — an enormous overhead for a small farm. 
When Global GAP (then European Retailer Partnership Good Agricultural Practices, ‘Eurep GAP’) became 
the standard for leading European supermarkets in 2007, many smallholders in Kenya and Senegal ceased 
to supply them. Horticulture exports from these countries now come mainly from large farms and not 
smallholdings. (Ashraf et al. 2008, Maertens and Swinnen 2009) Some donors and non-governmental 
agencies may have encouraged small farmers to try to satisfy these requirements without taking into 
consideration the high and recurring costs, or else by offering a subsidy on the initial costs that hardly help 
with recurrent requirements (Humphrey 2009, and Jaffee et al. 2011).
Not all smallholders have been excluded by these demands. For some family farmers, making GAP 
standards mandatory was not such a big step: they had already instituted some of the improvements 
necessary to meet the criteria. Some exporters with reliable suppliers were prepared to share some of the 
costs of the new procedures (Humphrey 2009). VegPro in Kenya, for example, has been prepared to help 
smallholder suppliers with meeting the standards, documenting them, and putting in place regular systems 
of audit to meet the criteria. 
Global GAP is one form of certification; other types can be seen in the organic and Fair Trade marks, the 
latter explicitly focused on smaller and poorer farmers. The cases of honey from Ethiopia, rice from Benin, 
some vegetables from Kenya and pineapples from Ghana include Fair Trade certification, with the costs 
apparently being paid for by NGOs in the first two cases, and exporting companies in the latter two. These 
can offer access to premium markets, although the number of producers who can take advantage before 
these markets become saturated is limited.
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BOX 3.4 SUDDEN LOSS OF EXPORT MARKETS, GHANA PINEAPPLES TO EU, 2000S
During the 1990s Ghana developed exports of fresh pineapple from smallholdings to Europe. At the time, the 
main potential competition came from neighbours such as Côte d’Ivoire. Given the turmoil in that country, how-
ever, Ghanaian exporters felt little pressure. 
From 2003 onwards, however, an unexpected change undermined Ghana’s position. Del Monte developed a pine-
apple variety in Costa Rica called MD2 suitable for long-range shipping, presenting an attractive fruit on delivery 
in distant Europe.
Ghana’s Smooth Cayenne variety might have competed, but producers and exporters failed to get the quality 
and consistency in shipped pineapple to match the MD2. Markets were thus lost, see Figure 3.5. After a few years, 
Ghana reacted by switching production to MD2, but in so doing the industry restructured as production shifted 
heavily to plantations owned by large companies. 
Some smallholders still grow on contract, most notably for Blue Skies, a processor and exporter, — see Appendix 
C — but conditions are stringent with export quality pineapple having to satisfy Global GAP requirements so that 
relatively few small-scale growers can take advantage.. 
sources: barrett et al. 2012, fold 2008, whitfield 2010
Figure 3.5  |  Ghana pineapple exports to the European Union, 
1999 to 2011
eurostat data, exports to the eu 27, standard international trade classification (sitc) code 05795.  
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Risk is the other concern with export markets: 
they can be less dependable than domestic 
markets. Standards, as seen, can abruptly exclude 
some small farmers. Competition, moreover, exists 
for premium export markets. Innovations by barely 
perceived competitors can suddenly change 
prospects for exporters, as Ghana discovered to its 
cost in the mid-2000s, see Box 3.4. 
GROWING DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL MARKETS
If non-traditional exports are an option for just a 
few smallholders owing to the limited size of these 
markets, domestic and regional food markets are 
larger and growing rapidly with urbanisation and 
rising incomes (World Bank 2012). In Africa it is 
expected that agricultural exports may be worth 
US$20 billion in 2030, up from US$11 billion in 
2000; while domestic and regional agricultural 
markets will expand from US$50 to 150 billion, see 
Figure 3.6. (CAADP 2009) 
Kenya green beans are a case in point. During 
the 1990s and early 2000s, export production 
increased with contracted smallholdings 
supplying a good share of the exports, but when 
Global GAP came into effect in 2007, many 
smallholders found themselves unable to export. 
This was not, however, the end of the story. Nairobi has a booming demand for fresh vegetables, so 
today the overwhelming amount of green beans and other vegetables grown on smallholdings in 
central Kenya are destined for the capital city, see Figure 3.7. While it is estimated that fewer than 
12,000 smallholders may grow for export, as many as 500,000 may be producing for the domestic 
market. (Jaffee et al. 2011)
The increasing attractions of domestic and regional markets can be seen with the Blue Skies processing 
plant in Ghana: of the 45 tonnes of fruit being procured a week, only one third of that is sent for export, the 
rest, mainly juice, is destined for the local markets. 
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Import substitution is another option. In two cases, that of Eagle Lager in Uganda and Guinness in 
Ghana, domestic sorghum production is being contracted to substitute in part for malt that would 
otherwise be imported. Shoprite in Zambia is trying to establish local procurement of fruit and 
vegetables to remove the need to import produce that meets the supermarket chain’s standards. One of 
the largest examples of import substitution comes from Uganda where one of the biggest oil processors 
in the country has as many as 54,000 smallholders growing sunflower for crushing. Given Uganda’s 
landlocked position and the relatively high cost of importing vegetable oils from the world market, there 
should be ample scope for good returns to domestically grown oilseeds. 
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Markets are of course growing and changing. Time may bring new opportunities, but it may also bring 
the threat of competition from lower-cost producers. For this reason, a roundtable of specialists and 
practitioners in smallholders and value-chains stressed the importance of regular analysis of markets, taking 
advantage of proven methods16 for detailed analysis of markets and the segments within them (Campbell 
2010). Analyses need to be undertaken jointly with stakeholders in the chain so the results are owned, 
understood and taken seriously. Benchmarking against competitors may be useful. 
A FOCUS FOR ACTION: PRODUCTION OR MARKETING, MAXIMISING OR REDUCING RISKS
To state what may seem obvious, those working with small farmers need to focus on what for them are the 
critical issues. This needs stating and developing, since initial diagnoses and assumptions about problems 
and opportunities may not be right. 
One way to consider the options is to see them as arrayed along two axes: one for production and 
marketing; the other for maximising and reducing risks. Table 3.1 presents choices along these two 
dimensions to produce the four quadrants of actions shown.
The top-left quadrant is about improving production on farm: raising yields, increasing productivity and 
reducing unit costs. The top-right sector concerns combating risks in production arising from weather, pests 
and disease. It comprises diversification of production and adopting varieties and methods that are resilient 
to physical challenges of pests and diseases — both of which, where risk averse, may involve sacrificing the 
maximum yield; protecting crops using chemical or biological defences, and insuring crops against loss. 
This last is rarely an option for smallholders today in Africa, but there are pilot schemes offering insurance 
against indices of weather, so it may become more of an option in the future. 
Marketing occupies the lower half of the table. The bottom-left cell includes strategies to sell for higher 
prices: through better informed negotiation, or by using more direct channels; or by raising quality, improving 
consistency, and certifying production that may allow access to premium markets. The lower-right quadrant 
depicts ways to reduce risks in marketing from variations in prices or changes in product specifications 
that may close off market opportunities. Responses to these may lie in diversifying production, or seeking 
additional and alternative markets so that exposure to any one product and market is reduced. Contracting 
where prices and specifications are agreed before production is another way to reduce risk. Increasingly there 
may be opportunities to hedge against price risks on the commodity exchanges that are gradually emerging 
across the continent, where futures contracts and even options may be on offer. 
The point here is to be aware that the most effective actions may lie in any of the four quadrants, or some 
combination of them. The points of emphasis, moreover, may shift through time as external conditions move, 
or as programmes move sequentially from dealing with the most pressing issues to the next most pressing 
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Table 3.1  |  Different emphases when working with smallholders
source: table 1 from barrett 2008
MAXIMISE RETURNS REDUCE RISK
PRODUCTION Produce more
Improve productivity, reduce unit costs
Reduce risks from weather, pests, disease
Use versatile and resilient varieties and 
methods
Crop protection, veterinary treatments
Crop and livestock insurance
MARKETING Sell for higher price — through better 
information for negotiation with traders, 
using more direct channels that cut out 
intermediaries, etc.
Higher quality, more consistency, 
certification with norms that can access 
premium markets
Reduce risks from fluctuating prices, changing 
market demands
Diversify production
Seek alternative markets
Contracting
Hedge on commodity exchanges [future option]
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— see Box 3.5 for an example from Uganda. Value-chain analyses can be helpful in identifying critical points 
for intervention, especially when they have the participation of key stakeholders.
The danger for those working with smallholders is to assume that the priorities lie in just one area, usually 
that for which the outside agency has competence. For those working in value-chains, moreover, the natural 
tendency is to see the issues as lying in marketing — and then imagining that this requires action from 
producers. From a team working with dairy cooperatives in Kenya comes the following admonishment:
In well-functioning value chains, dairy farmers are happy to focus on what they are best at — farming 
— to maximize their earnings. Instability in markets compels farmers to engage in more downstream 
activities to achieve better control of the chain. For the farmers this often comes with complexities that 
are often beyond their financial and technical capacities. (Maina et al. 2010)
So, perhaps a point to add, is that wherever in the scheme the priority may lie, some thought needs to be 
given to who may be the most appropriate actor to address the problem or opportunity.
BOX 3.5 SUPPLYING KAMPALA RESTAURANTS WITH POTATOES FROM KABALE DISTRICT, UGANDA
The story of the Nyabyumaba farmers group from Kabale District in Uganda shows how support needs to follow sequenc-
es. The group was formed in 1998 with support from Africare, initially working on production of seed potatoes, where deal-
ing with pests and disease was the priority. However, it soon became clear that the market for seed potatoes was limited. 
Hence, in 2003, links were made to the Nando’s restaurant chain in Kampala which was short of local potatoes 
and was preparing to import frozen potato chips. A contract was signed between Nando’s and the farmer group for 
supply of potatoes, that stated a price, potato variety and quality, volume and frequency of supply. To meet the 
specifications the group then went back to researchers to help them produce consistently large potatoes. Plant 
spacing and use of fertiliser were the answers. Then they looked to address the issue of regular supply through-
out the year, that led to irrigation and planting in swamps to produce a crop in the dry season. It also led to col-
lective agreement amongst the individual growers on planting schedules. 
When International Centre for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) support for the programme ended in 2007, the arrange-
ment was hit by lower demand from Nando’s and rising transport costs from Kabale to Kampala. This has led to 
the group abandoning seasonal production to cut their costs and they are looking for diversified markets. 
The lesson here is that challenges change through time, as do the demands of markets, to which farmers have to 
adapt. At times that may mean the issue is production, at other times it is about marketing; while the emphasis 
between producing quality potatoes and keeping costs low may change as well.
sources: aliguma et al. 2007, fao and southern africa confederation of agricultural unions (sacau) 2011
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SUMMARISING: KEY LESSONS FROM THE INVESTMENT CASE
There has to be a return to farmers for improving their links to markets, whether these are for produce, 
inputs or some service, such as finance. In contemporary Africa there are increasing reasons for engaging 
with markets since there are increasing opportunities to sell produce for a remunerative price, while the 
range of technologies embodied in external inputs on offer is also growing. The two are related: the 
higher the prices for output, the wider the range of technologies that become profitable. 
Three things need attention to realise this potential:
 ● Government has to fulfil the roles that only government can: setting an investment climate that 
enables and encourages investment and innovation, and providing those public goods that allow 
farms and other private firms to work well. The investment climate does not have to be perfect, 
only that the worst flaws are removed. Many of the public goods, and the most costly, needed to 
support farming are not agricultural; the budgets for public investment lie with ministries other than 
agriculture. Agricultural research and extension matter for farmers, but equally so too do passable 
rural roads, schools, clean water and health services;
 ● Smallholders need to be steered towards those markets that are appropriate for them in the 
standards that are demanded and the risks they entail. Domestic and regional markets are usually less 
demanding and more reliable than export markets. They are also larger and growing more quickly. For 
most smallholders these are the output markets they need to serve. Some can access high-value, air-
freighted channels for niche produce, but they will be a small minority. It is a mistake to imagine that 
most farmers can do this. The bulk of attention by governments, donors and NGOs should therefore 
be directed to the domestic and regional markets. This applies all the more strongly since the high-
value export chains have been, and can be, developed by private firms with very little help from 
government — other than, of course, providing and maintaining an enabling environment;
 ● Those working with smallholders need to recognise that problems and opportunities may lie in 
production or marketing, in maximising returns, or in avoiding losses. These targets, moreover, will 
change through time. It is a big a mistake to imagine that the opportunities always lie in marketing 
as it has been in the past for agriculturalists to assume that farmers’ priorities lie in production 
alone. Even when the priorities lie in the supply chains off the farm, that does not necessarily mean 
that farmers should be engaged in dealing with these. 
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3.2 APPROACH TO LINKING
One of the strongest lessons seen in the cases and literature is the importance of the approach taken 
to linking, especially by public agencies of government and NGOs, often with donor support. Processes 
are stressed repeatedly, models less so. Two aspects stand out for those agencies that help farmers link 
to markets: facilitating activity by others, rather than replacing that activity, and promoting learning. Each 
encounters dilemmas in practice.
FACILITATING AND ENABLING
Links will only be sustained if operated by farms, collective and private enterprises — and not by a 
programme or the agency that runs a programme. Hence, the actions of farms, firms and collectives need to 
be stimulated and facilitated:
… a facilitation approach seeks to shift the way firms behave and relate to each other to bring about 
change in a market system such that the system itself delivers the goods and services necessary for 
upgrading. (Campbell 2010)
The ideals are clear. Facilitation is about building the capacity of those in the supply chains to solve 
their problems. It means enabling, then withdrawing. Correspondingly, it is not doing things that can 
lead to dependency. It is about not replacing links in the chain with the actions of the facilitator, and 
certainly not intermediating in deals. It means not providing subsidies that have to continue beyond 
the time for learning. 
These ideals are easily stated, but harder to put into practice. Intervention starts from links that are 
either absent or working poorly. Action has to begin somewhere and often a new actor is needed 
to act as a catalyst. Existing actors in the chain, and especially smallholders, may need temporary 
support to allow them to learn or to take on new initiatives without undue risk. Such support may 
take the form of training, advice and technical information, facilitating meetings between farmers and 
buyers who have not done business before, provision of capital grants to allow initial investments 
in production, storage, processing or transport, or underwriting novel schemes with the intervener 
guaranteeing to buy back unsold inventory, to cover (some) bad debt, to support prices should they 
prove lower than expected, and so on. 
Such support needs, however, to be temporary, to be strictly limited to things that will catalyse changes and 
allow the private and collective actors in the chain to continue on their own. That may be well understood 
by all parties at the outset, but dangers arise in practice for both those in the supply chains and for 
intervening agencies. 
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For the former, dependency is the temptation. Support from outside can create expectations. If support goes 
beyond facilitation and starts to take action directly to create links or solve problems, those supported run 
the risk of losing sight of their own agency:
‘Organizational development focused primarily on identifying and solving problems had a 
disempowering effect, reinforcing smallholders’ view of themselves as overwhelmed by problems and 
requiring the help of outsiders to overcome them.’  Facilitating Behavior Change and Transforming 
Relationships, SDC Asia, 2008 cited in Campbell (2010)
The danger of dependency is exacerbated by the temptation for well-funded and well-meaning interveners 
to argue for further support, since they fear that to withdraw at a given point would risk all efforts made to 
date being lost. 
For agencies intervening, further temptations lie in using their expertise, capacity and finances to act directly 
and solve problems, since this will allow them to fulfil plans and targets, and above all, to avoid failures — a 
knotty issue which will be discussed in the next section on learning.
How can these dilemmas be confronted in practice? Having clear exit strategies early on may help, although 
that rather presumes that interventions can be well defined in advance, as can be the moment that they will 
end: as will be shown, that may be unrealistic. 
The cases reviewed do not often show a clear exit strategy in place. In one third of the cases, the initiatives 
were taken by private firms in which start-up costs had to be part of the business model. In the other 
two-thirds, where there was a (public) intervening agency, few had clear exit strategies. A typical dilemma is 
illustrated by the OAF, see Box 3.6. This initiative strives to keep costs low, aiming to reach the point where 
it can be a self-sustaining programme. Staff report that it has become 80% self-funded, an honourable 
achievement in a short time, but how will the remaining 20% of support from outside be entirely replaced? 
The programme is still developing and learning, so to demand a precise answer may be unfair. However, the 
question remains as a nagging doubt about its sustainability.
There’s another pitfall for the unwary. Ill-considered programming can lead to a double problem: that 
of offering too much support early on, then abruptly withdrawing this in line with the programmed exit. 
Business development services funded by donors are a case in point: 
Programs designed to support local “business development services” have tended to initially 
oversubsidize these services and then prematurely withdraw the support (in line with short project 
cycles), all too often leaving behind a distorted market for technical, advisory, and auditing services 
and relatively few examples of viable service providers able to withstand any significant production or 
market shock. (Jaffee et al. 2011)
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Recognising the issues may help. Even concepts and labels may be useful, as for example in the West Africa 
programme of building agri-business clusters funded by IFDC where participants with a long-term stake 
in the outcomes were termed ‘problem-owners’, thereby making their interests distinct from those of the 
programme (Maatman et al. 2011). 
The issues, however, may not be clear unless the underlying substance is also clear. Certification provides 
an example: is it the paperwork and especially the initial documentation that matters? Or is it about the 
underlying procedures that allow audit and certification, procedures that need to be maintained? Compared 
to the demands of the latter, getting the original certification may be the easy part:
The biggest challenge for a process standard is to maintain the integrity of the standard through 
defined procedures, record-keeping, internal audit and third-party certification. The certification element 
is only one element, and not necessarily the most important. (Humphrey 2009)
When Global GAP came to apply in Kenyan horticultural exports, donors were mainly concerned about 
start-up costs for smallholders. Humphrey (2009) considers that they were less aware of the demanding 
disciplines and associated heavy recurrent costs.
BOX 3.6 ONE ACRE FUND: GETTING MAIZE AND BEAN SEED AND FERTILISER TO MARGINALISED FARMERS
OAF is a non-governmental initiative that began in Western Kenya in 2006, in areas with very heavy pressure on 
land, so that most farmers have small plots, and where food production is often less than household needs, given 
the low yields that many farmers obtain.
The Fund provides farmers, those with one hectare or less of land, many of them women, with a simple package 
of inputs for maize and beans: hybrid seed and nitrogen fertiliser, on credit, plus technical advice. There is also a 
guarantee to buy-back the crop surpluses of farmers who cannot otherwise find a buyer. Inputs are advanced in 
kind, then costs deducted when crops are sold or delivered to the Fund. 
The system operates through field officers recruited from amongst the farmers, who work with groups of 200 
– 250 farmers, formed around existing women’s groups. The groups assume liability for the inputs loaned. Field 
officers are then supervised, supported and provided with inputs by a management hierarchy that leads upwards 
to a district manager. The organisation appears economical, with relatively few managers compared to the farmers 
served. Consequently, the Fund may be covering 80% or more of its costs. 
OAF has subsequently expanded the system to Rwanda and most recently to Burundi. 
There are reports of maize yields tripling from 0.5 tonne to 1.5 tonnes an acre. Coverage is impressive: by 2012, 
130,000 farmers were reached in the three countries. 
 
see appendix c for more detail and source
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However, perhaps the greater challenge to facilitation lies with learning and the consequent dilemma this 
poses for those planning action. 
LEARNING AND OVERCOMING OBSTACLES
Again, it is easy to state the issue. Progress will rarely be made by intervening with a ready-made solution: 
effective links will more likely be built by careful adaptation to circumstances and the (growing) capacities 
of the key players, reinforced by learning and adjustment. It is almost inevitable that programmes will 
encounter unforeseen and unforeseeable obstacles. Recognising them, then learning how to overcome 
such hurdles, implies additional and usually unplanned efforts: there thus has to be flexibility in operating 
systems in time, staff and budgets to allow for such learning and responding. 
Most of the cases reviewed demonstrate operations being changed in response to learning, usually having 
stumbled across some problem. Earlier sequences of actions were mentioned, with the example of Kabale 
potato growers in Uganda, where the emphasis of their efforts began with production on farm, turned to 
marketing, but then had to return to the fields to meet the demands then discovered in the market. 
Dunavant cotton in Zambia tried several ways to distribute inputs to its growers and to recover the costs, 
while avoiding side-selling by growers, before arriving at the current model of farmer-distributors. This 
has solved most of the problem by using local farmers who both know how trustworthy their neighbours 
are, and who are encouraged by varying commissions to make sure that the value of inputs advanced is 
recouped by sales to Dunavant when the cotton is harvested. 
Several contract farming schemes, including that of Eagle Lager in Uganda, have seen changes in the 
numbers of growers as both parties, processor and growers, have learned whether the arrangement works 
for them. 
OAF report that almost every element of their current model is the result of revising an initial idea: 
We have gotten everything wrong at some point— our agronomy, our repayment procedures, our HR 
(human resources) practices, our farmer enrolment strategies. (Youn, founder of One Acre Fund)
Linking Local Learners (LLL) promotes learning explicitly by encouraging peer learning, by having their 
different associates — brokers, transport operators, traders — write up their experiences to be shared with 
others in the network, see Box 3.7.
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Some efforts, moreover, will be frustrated, they will fail. The rate of failure of new businesses, 
particularly small ones, is high the world over and especially in rural Africa (Liedholm 2007). 
Interveners need to be prepared, then, to abandon some endeavours. In business this is painful; but 
less painful than piling up losses by running failing businesses. However, in public agencies, both 
governmental and non-governmental, it may be possible to persist pointlessly, especially when 
admission of failure is seen, as is often the case in hierarchical organisations, as tantamount to an 
admission of professional incompetence.
BOX 3.7 LINKING LOCAL LEARNERS: PEER LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE
One of the most radical attempts to improve staples marketing seen so far, LLL is an initiative pioneered by Pride 
Africa, an NGO based in Nairobi. The ambition here is high: it attempts nothing less than to change the usual 
model of operations for traders, from trying to create margins that benefit them, to selling on commission.
LLL establishes local brokers living in villages and rural markets linked to district, regional and national hubs. The 
hubs provide, via web sites and texts, the broker with information and contacts for marketing. The broker then sets 
up deals between buyers in distant markets and local farmer groups. Brokers work with farmers to make sure that 
consignments are assembled to schedule, quantity and quality; then packed and transported to buyer. 
The brokers never take control of produce: instead they work for a commission paid on the value of the sales. 
Thus, they have an incentive to get the best deal for the farmers, since the higher the farmer price, the greater 
their commission. Transparency is stressed: the brokers show farmer groups how their price relates to the buyer 
offer, and how much the broker takes.
The system includes secure transactions, through which farmers can be paid the moment they deliver their bags. 
Bags are tagged and coded so that shipments can be traced from farm to warehouse, so that problems can be 
detected and resolved 
Village brokers also act as distributors to national manufacturers and wholesalers: agricultural inputs, water tanks 
and filters, sprayers, tea, flour, animal feed. For national companies finding local distributors is valuable. For the 
brokers, it adds to their earnings.
During 2011 twelve trader networks across Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania conducted some eighty deals benefitting 
over one thousand small farmers. Farmers got an average of around 15–20% more money into their pockets than 
had they sold through other existing channels. Costs per deal have been kept down to only 20% of total value, so 
that farmers have obtained 80% of the distant buyers’ price. 
A feature of LLL is the intensity of learning, promoted through peer to peer exchange of experience, through web 
accounts of experiences. These include some frank and convincing accounts of the difficulties of doing business 
in rural East Africa, and how those involved have coped with the dangers and setbacks that arise in practice.
 
see appendix c for details and sources
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Less is known about outright failures, since as noted in the introduction, such cases tend not to be written 
up. The main example from the cases can be seen in contracting schemes, where the considerable 
fluctuations in the numbers of growers signed up indicates that for some farmers, the contract did not work. 
DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS FROM APPROACHES
It is easy to state the case for facilitation, enabling and learning. The implications for programming the work 
of an organisation that facilitates, enables and learns can, however, be challenging.17
Enabling and facilitation are processes that are not readily programmed in advance: it is hard to be sure just 
what the needs will be in a year’s time. So, plans have to be flexible. Building capacity takes time, so does 
overcoming unforeseen obstacles. Those engaged in such processes are unanimous that one or two year’s 
actions will rarely be enough: five to ten years may be more realistic. In practice, flexible plans and allowing 
time for additional efforts means having contingency funds. 
If learning is to take place, then programmes have to monitor progress with information that meets the 
needs of programme participants — as opposed to the demands for data on indicators by headquarters. 
Programme staff have to have the freedom to admit that elements of the programme may not be working — 
or indeed, that some initiatives have failed — and hence to change their operations accordingly. 
These criteria may not, however, fit easily with the needs of many organisations for precise programming, 
budgeting and monitoring; with close control of plans by year, half-year and even by quarter, with corresponding 
targets for progress in the short run. For some agencies, those with strong role18 organisation cultures, these 
programmes may simply be unthinkable: their demands conflict too much with organisational culture. 
Those intervening agencies that can accommodate the kind of flexible planning and implementation 
indicated may be able to cope by having a diverse portfolio of initiatives, proceeding at different speeds, with 
these jointly programmed so that staff time and resources can be switched from one initiative to another as 
and when needed. A diverse portfolio also allows some failing endeavours to be dropped, in the reasonable 
expectation that other initiatives will bear fruit and justify the overall portfolio. 
Some of the cases,19 however, suggest another factor that can overcome the difficulties of programming 
processes whose outcomes cannot be predicted in detail: leadership. Long recognised in development 
literature (see, for example, Korten 1980), committed leaders who sustain their active interest in initiatives 
can square the programming circle. Good leaders can recognise the tensions between control in the short 
run and adaptation in the longer run, and thereby bridge the gap between the overall goal and the everyday 
realities of hard work and problems, sustaining the morale of all involved in the process. Practically they can 
ensure that field managers have the flexibility, resources and political support to develop field programmes. 
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So, what does this imply for those wanting to promote linkages? Three things stand out:
 ● Allow time for these initiatives, recognise there may be setbacks, even outright failures, and make 
learning a prime objective — that means allocating funds for monitoring, evaluating, documenting and 
disseminating;
 ● If a funding agency cannot work directly and meet the operating demands set out above —many donors 
who have to follow general civil service rules will find this difficult — then look to work through partners 
who have organisational cultures that allow them to work more flexibly. Fund a portfolio of initiatives, 
preferably run by different agencies, to even out disbursement and to make it likely that there will be 
enough success to justify the overall investment — and to allow the funder to drop implementers that 
do not deliver; and,
 ● Assess agencies for funding on the criteria of whether they have the capacity to operate flexibly — and 
preferably the experience that shows they do so, and by leadership — even if this latter is not easy to 
judge. 
3.3 ORGANISING LINKS: CHAMPIONS, FORUMS, GROUPS AND LINKS
This section deals with the architecture of the links to markets observed. It examines key elements of 
the structures seen: the roles of catalysts or ‘champions’ of supply chains, of forums that bring together 
stakeholders, and of groups of farmers. It then looks at the most common form of link seen: contracting. A 
last section reviews experiences of links to farmers growing staple, rather than high value foods: where the 
low value of produce raises the question of whether investment in improved links is worthwhile.
CATALYSTS AND SUPPLY CHAIN CHAMPIONS
Who takes the initiative to form the links? In several of the cases reviewed, a large and formal firm — a 
processor, exporter, or retail chain — takes the initiative to set up the links. Rarely does this come from a 
smaller operator, still less from farmers themselves. The incentive in these cases is largely commercial gain; 
more specifically, the large firm wants a supply for a profitable outlet. Some of these cases are for export: 
vegetables from Kenya and pineapples from Ghana, for example, where high prices in European markets are 
the incentive. Equally there are opportunities for import substitution, especially for higher-value produce 
such as vegetable oils. In these cases, imported oils can be expensive owing to high transport costs so that 
attractive prices can be paid for domestically-produced substitutes. 
Companies turn to smallholders when there is no other convenient supply or when it seems that smallholders 
may be able to supply at lower cost than possible alternative supplies from larger farms. In some cases, there 
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may be few large farms so that the choice is sourcing from smallholders or importing. Given the costs of 
dealing with many farms, smallholders will only be engaged when they have a competitive advantage over 
other options, either because they can deliver at lower cost, or occasionally because smallholders can deliver 
better quality than larger operations, as applies with crops that require hand-picking.
The other prominent catalysts are non-governmental organisations who aim to improve links as part of 
their mission to reduce poverty. Most of those in the cases surveyed are NGOs that specialise in making 
commercial links, such as SNV and Technoserve. They typically partner private firms that are expected to 
continue linking to smallholders after the NGO has contributed with training, facilitating analysis, contacts 
and conversations amongst firms, farmers and other stakeholders. 
Government agencies are only occasionally the champions of change, most notably in longstanding public 
enterprises such as the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA). They are not, however, absent from these 
initiatives, and are usually part of stakeholder dialogues and forums for particular product value-chains; but 
they are rarely the ones making the first moves. 
An unusual initiative, in that the champions of links would be neither a firm, NGO nor government agency is 
the LLL, see Box 3.7. In this case, it is local agents working on commission who champion links between firms 
in cities seeking supplies and groups of farmers who might grow the produce.   
It probably matters less which agency takes the lead on forming links, than that there is an agency prepared to 
invest time and resources to making the link work. This begs the question of whether the business opportunity 
will be sufficient to motivate firms to take on this role; a question to be addressed in the conclusions.
GENERATING CONSENSUS AND INTEREST: STAKEHOLDER FORUMS
Forums that bring together government, firms, civil society and farmers to consider the issues affecting a 
particular value-chain and to decide on actions to improve functioning are seen in several of the cases. They 
can be seen as playing a prominent role in changes to legislation for Kenyan dairying, and in formulating 
national strategies for the development of cotton in Burkina Faso, coffee in Rwanda, sunflower in Uganda 
and rice in Zambia.  
Forums can potentially allow diagnosis of problems to allow a sharp focus on critical bottlenecks and ways 
to relieve them. They can mobilise energies to overcome problems that require joint action, where individual 
agents and agencies do not act since they have no confidence that others will act. In some cases they can 
generate sufficient interest from key actors for regulations and rules that impede the development of the 
sector to be changed. 
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In the cases where they are reported to have made a difference, the common feature is that there has been 
a prominent opportunity that is readily apparent: either a chance to replace imports by domestic production, 
as seen for Uganda sunflower, or the need to stimulate a key export, as applies for coffee in Rwanda. 
GROUPING SMALLHOLDERS
Rarely can large-scale firms in supply chains — processors, wholesalers, retail chains, input wholesalers, 
banks, etc. — deal directly with individual small-scale farmers. The costs are usually too high, not just in 
administering many small deals, but also, and often more important when it comes to deferred deals such 
as contracts and credit, in ensuring that farmers who are party to deals are competent and trustworthy. 
Hence, there has to be some point in the chain where the farmers are aggregated, either directly, as in a 
farmer group, association or cooperative; or indirectly, through the intermediation of local input dealers or 
appointed distributors, lead farmers, bank agents, and so on.
In most of the cases reviewed, smallholders have been grouped together. Some evidence suggests that 
these groups tend to reflect the received wisdom of successful groups (as set out in section 2.3), namely: 
most of the groups are local and small, they usually bring together no more than few dozen members from 
the same location; and, they usually have a specific and limited agenda, often formed to sell produce, or to 
receive inputs or services — and nothing more. In several cases, the groups have been formed around existing 
groups, such as the women’s groups that form the core of those receiving the seed and fertiliser distributed 
by OAF in Kenya. Using existing groups increases the chance of group cohesion, but it may not always be 
socially inclusive — a theme to which discussion will return in the next section. 
There were just a few exceptions to use of farmer groups. In one case, that of Spar in South Africa, where 
produce was sourced from individual farmers, but given that these tended to be larger than average small 
farms, that may be an exception that confirms the general proposition. The other exceptions were two 
cases where local intermediaries served to bulk up produce from farmers and to distribute inputs to them. 
Dunavant Cotton, for example, decided to link to contracted farmers through distributors based in villages, 
selected from amongst the local farmers, see Box 3.8. 
CONTRACTING: THE DOMINANT LINK
Contracting is the dominant form of link in the cases reviewed. Contracts, however, include a wide range of 
arrangements in terms of how many strands the agreements have, and how much is staked by both parties. 
About half of these involve the simplest form of contracting: an agreement over sale of produce with 
nothing else included. The other half involve interlinked contracts with inputs being advanced and linked 
to sales contracts. These often involve technical assistance as well — partly to ensure that inputs are used 
effectively, partly to encourage farmers to honour their sales obligation and not to sell on the side. 
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In most cases, the smallholders contracted report a range of benefits from the arrangement, including: 
higher prices for produce that they could not otherwise get, since in some cases the contract gave access 
to an export market as applied, for example, to honey from Ethiopia; improved productivity since the 
contract gave them access to inputs and know-how that otherwise would have been difficult or costly to 
obtain; and the reassurance of having an assured and reliable market for surpluses — that in some cases 
was preferable to possibly higher prices in the open market, as applied, for example, to farmers selling 
sorghum to a brewery in Uganda.
Side-selling by contracted farmers is a perennial problem with contracts, one that applied in several 
cases here, where the contract involved a crop that could be sold in another channel. In at least one 
case, that of sunflower growers in Uganda, it seems the processor had accepted that a large fraction of 
the agreed volume — as much as 40% — might eventually be sold to another buyer. Three responses to 
side-selling were reported. 
VegPro in Kenya realised that setting prices for the year without reference to the going rate in the 
spot market was leading to two problems: when market prices occasionally rose over the fixed price 
on offer in the contract, farmers would sell on the side; and when the market price dipped, contracted 
BOX 3.8 DUNAVANT COTTON’S LOCAL DISTRIBUTORS, DEALING WITH SIDE-SELLING
In 1994 Zambia abandoned its existing model for cotton, where a public company, the Lint Company of Zambia 
(LINTCO), had a monopoly of cotton buying, processing and selling. In its place two private companies, Clark and 
Lonrho, the latter subsequently bought out by Dunavant, entered the market. Both employed their own extension 
agents to advance inputs to growers, with costs deducted from payments for delivered cotton.
By the late 1990s, however, additional ginners entered the market, so that processing capacity exceeded cot-
ton production. As the ginners scrambled for supplies, it led to chronic problems of side-selling and defaults on 
inputs advanced by the two largest firms. 
When Dunavant took over Lonrho’s operations in 2000, it did away with the Lonrho model of 800 extension 
agents, a major overhead. Instead, Dunavant recruited distributors who conveyed inputs to farmers on credit, 
typically around 65 of them for each distributor, in return for cotton. Paid on commission rather than a salary, 
the distributors received a commission that varied with the credit recovery rate, rising to as much as 21% if there 
were no defaults at all. 
The distributors were required to be local residents and to be cotton farmers themselves. They were trained not 
only on production, but also on credit management. 
The model worked: within 3 years, Dunavant was recovering 93% of its advanced credit. The distributors had the 
incentive to prevent side-selling, but equally being locals they presumably had more knowledge of who was 
credit-worthy, and in any case could monitor crops and harvests amongst the local farmers.  
see appendix c for details and sources.
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growers were likely to buy in produce from their neighbours to increase volume. Since VegPro’s growers 
were Global GAP certified while the neighbours almost certainly were not, then this could have led to 
de-listing by European buyers: a serious risk. VegPro thus switched from annual fixed prices to weekly 
prices, set in relation to the going market rate. They also employed field supervisors to exercise more 
control over their contracted growers.  
Another response, seen for soya contracts in Togo, was to use moral persuasion through peer groups 
into which farmers had been organised, appealing to group solidarity and norms of reciprocity to ensure 
that produce grown with inputs delivered would be sold back.
A third variant, as used by Dunavant cotton in Zambia, was using local knowledge, by appointing local 
distributors of inputs, picked from out of the local farming community, see Box 3.8, to try to ensure that 
farmers were of good character.
One of the main reasons smallholders agree to participate in contract farming is the promise of a steady 
and increased income from the sale of their crops. Not all contracting was predictable and reliable 
however, see Box 3.9.
Contracting clearly can work well. It can even work when some of the well-known conditions for 
success, such as the processors having a local monopoly that makes side-selling impossible, do not 
apply. It is clear that no one model of contracting will be appropriate, that contracting needs adaptation 
to the crop, the business model and local farmer circumstances, and that adaptation often comes 
through learning. 
OVERCOMING LIMITED ACCESS TO INPUTS AND FINANCE
As reported in section 2.2, some see the limited use of fertiliser and other inputs on food crops in Africa 
as potentially a poverty trap for smallholders. Many of the cases reviewed include distribution of inputs 
as part of a contract, but they are usually for export and cash crops where side-selling can be limited. 
So these do not necessarily address the problem of the difficulties that small farmers have in obtaining 
inputs for food crops. Four experiences, however, do: AGRA’s programme in northern Ghana; PrOpCom’s 
fertiliser distribution system in Nigeria; SNV’s agro-dealers in Zimbabwe; and the OAF in Kenya. 
The approaches of AGRA in northern Ghana and SNV in Zimbabwe are similar: they aim to strengthen 
the performance of local input dealers by providing inventory credit and insurance against losses. They 
also train input wholesalers and rural dealers on business management and instruct dealers on the use 
of inputs so they can give informed advice to their farmer customers. 
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The AGRA programme in northern Ghana aims to provide access to technology, inputs, finance and 
marketing. In the breadth of services this resembles the old parastatals, but unlike those, only one of 
these services, extension, is provided by the Ministry of Agriculture. The rest are commercially operated. 
The Savannah Farmers Marketing Company (SFMC) buys crops from farmers. Loans, guaranteed by 
AGRA, come from banks to finance inputs that in turn are delivered through local dealers — 200 of 
whom have been trained and given grants to increase their outreach. AGRA also pays for ploughing for 
the smallholders who cannot afford this. 
So far, the system is working. The question still to be answered, however, is how sustainable the systems 
will be when AGRA withdraws support after the three years of operation programmed. It also remains to 
be seen how this system will cope with the inevitable year of bad weather when harvests are poor.20
3.9 UNPREDICTABLE CONTRACTS FOR SORGHUM 
GROWERS IN UGANDA
In Uganda, Nile Breweries contracted supplies 
of sorghum through an independent company, 
Afro Kai Ltd (AKL). In the early years of the 
initiative, farmers were reluctant to adopt the 
seeds that produced the Epuripur variety needed 
for brewing. AKL thus began a more aggressive 
strategy to increase volume by expanding the 
number of farmers recruited, including some 
relatively large-scale farmers. This succeeded 
only too well: by 2006 there was over-supply, 
with more than double the Nile Breweries’ 
requirements being delivered that year. Contracts 
were, however, honoured; but some growers were 
told by AKL that they would not buy sorghum the 
next year, although they softened the blow by 
supplying farmers with maize and rice seed.
The company then addressed the problem of 
potential over-supply by selective distribution 
of seeds, picking out specific communities 
for long-term relations, and by more timely 
communication with farmers. In 2007/08, the 
number of farmers in the scheme dropped 
to 1,071; but the company’s brewing capacity 
expanded subsequently so that by 2009, 5,800 
farmers were involved — see Figure 3.9.
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Figure 3.9  |  Farmers contracted 
to grow Epuripur sorghum for Nile 
Breweries in Uganda
source:  compiled from data in jaffee et al. 2011.
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SNV in Zimbabwe piloted their scheme in 2009/10, investing US$12,500 in insurance to leverage 
stocking of inputs locally worth nearly US$545,000. Following this success, the scheme has been 
increased, to the level of US$112,000 of insurance backing up sales of more than US$9.3M, with almost 
700 rural dealers engaged. The unusual detail in this case is that the dealers were not told that 
insurance was in place, to avoid moral hazard of wilful default on their credit from the wholesalers. 
This experience is still relatively new, although it is similar to schemes that operated in rural Zimbabwe 
before the economic recession began in the late 1990s. It presumably depends on smallholders having 
the cash to buy inputs. They have certainly been prepared to use inputs. During the most difficult times, 
donors distributed inputs for free. Later, they gave poor and vulnerable smallholders vouchers to buy 
inputs at seed fairs and from rural dealers. It remains to be seen, however, whether this has stimulated 
demand by farmers and supply capacity by local dealers, for input use to be sustained. 
In Nigeria, PrOpCom has worked since 2002 to improve the supply of fertiliser to smallholders, in a 
context where much of the fertiliser is subsidised and consequently tends to get appropriated by larger 
farmers. The response has been to use Village Promoters to sell small packs (1kg) of fertiliser (urea and 
NPK) to farmers in their surrounding communities. Demonstration plots run by the promoters educate 
farmers on use of fertiliser and good farming practices. Promoters take a commission on sales sufficient 
to reward them for their time. Following pilots, full implementation began in early 2011 across 400 
locations: by late 2011 over 4,000 tonnes of fertiliser had been sold in small packs to more than 1 million 
farmers, with more than 210,000 trained in fertiliser application. 
As with Zimbabwe, the programme assumes that there is an unmet demand for fertiliser, and that 
farmers have the cash to buy — with sales in small packs to meet demand from smallholders with 
limited cash and land to plant. 
One Acre Fund in western Kenya, Rwanda and most recently in Burundi, follows a different path. 
It procures and distributes inputs, mainly seed and fertiliser for maize and beans, through its own 
organisation where field officers recruited locally form the point of contact to large groups of farmers, 
many of them women. Payment for inputs is taken at end of season in the form of maize and beans sold 
back to One Acre. The Fund is considering the sale of simple crop insurance to address the problem of 
occasional crop failure.
The programme uses a very tight and lean hierarchy to keep costs down; the idea being if the system 
can be made economical enough, it can be run without subsidy from the Fund. One Acre is perhaps, of 
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all the programmes, the one most closely focused on very small-scale farmers with small plots and 
very few assets: precisely the group for which a poverty trap could arise.
These experiences are still relatively novel. In all four cases, they have apparently overcome potential 
supply constraints by establishing working channels for access to seed, fertiliser and other inputs. In at 
least two cases, simple, weather-based insurance is being piloted. Limited working capital is addressed 
by a form of contract for One Acre, and by bank loans for AGRA. Which of these experiences will stand 
the test of time and prove sustainable remains to be seen. 
SUMMARY: ORGANISING LINKS
The cases reviewed here suggest that some things usually need to be in place to improve links to market. 
 ● There needs to be some actor or agency that takes the initiative to make better links. Two such 
agents stand out, private firms that have the incentive of profit from an exceptional opportunity and 
public agencies, more often non-governmental than part of government. 
 ● Given that changes being made may involve some change in policy, regulations (or the way they are 
interpreted and applied), then forums that bring together stakeholders have often been important 
to allow the creation of mutual understanding of issues, to forge a consensus on action, and to 
allocate responsibilities. 
 ● In most cases, smallholders need grouping to interact more effectively with others in the supply 
chain. Given that this has been achieved, there are reasons for optimism about such collective 
action, provided that the aims and means of such groups are kept — at least in the early stages — 
simple and straightforward. 
Contracting is often seen, and can work well, although there are a wide range of arrangements seen. 
These are anything but static models: contracts can change — and indeed should, if there is to be 
sensible adaptation to emerging facts. Farmers, moreover, enter and leave such schemes more than 
might be imagined from the sense of a contract as a document, a stated model. 
Many of the cases deal with higher value crop and livestock products, whether for export or for the 
domestic market. Food staples, and the problems that producers of these face in getting effective 
access to finance and inputs, tend to be left out. Yet there are cases where programmes address these 
issues, with some success — at least in the short term. Beyond that the question of sustaining the 
initiatives seen remains to be answered.  
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3.4 BEYOND THE FRAMEWORK: SOCIAL INCLUSION AND GENDER
The framework considers the elements that make for effective links from smallholders to markets. It does 
not directly address the question of whether the way that smallholders are linked to markets is equitable. 
So, what insights into social equity emerge from these cases?
SOCIAL INCLUSION
The cases reviewed all include small-scale family farms, but not necessarily marginal farms. When 
private firms link to smallholders, it is difficult for small farms to participate in the scheme unless 
the farm is large enough to allow some land to be switched to production for the market — one tenth 
of a hectare, however, is often enough. Households also need labour, and perhaps equipment and 
capital, to devote to the market enterprise. Hence, it is not surprising that in those cases where scheme 
participants can be compared to the rest of the local rural population, they often have (a little) more 
land, labour, capital and often education as well. 
For example, a seed company in Zimbabwe believed that only farmers with more than one hectare were 
likely to find participating profitable, so they only drew up contracts with farmers who had at least this much 
land. Consistent local suppliers of vegetables to SPAR stores in South Africa had on average 13.6 hectares of 
land, compared to 2.5 hectares for occasional suppliers, and 1.3 hectares for suppliers who left the scheme. 
More than 40% of the consistent suppliers, furthermore, owned a tractor. 
Eagle Lager in Uganda sources sorghum from smallholders, but not all those running the operation are 
convinced this is viable. The manager of Eagle Lager’s partner that handles the link to small-scale sorghum 
growers stated in a presentation: ‘Sustainable long-term operations [are] at risk since production is in the 
hands of smallholder growers’. There may be a divergence here between the senior management of the 
international corporation which owns Eagle Lager, who see the arrangement as a good example of corporate 
social responsibility, and the field managers of the partner who are very probably rewarded for ensuring 
reliable supplies and given little if any credit for social responsibility.21
It is not just the demands of processors and large firms in supply chains that tend to result in marginal farmers 
being left out. When groups of farmers form, marginal farmers may be excluded deliberately on the grounds 
of their limited capacity, especially when there is joint liability for loans or for delivering output. For example, 
the smallest farms — especially those short of labour — were not included in the Soja Nyo (SN) project in Togo 
since they were not trusted or seen as loyal to the group and its aim of supplying soya to the company. 
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There are exceptions, however. OAF deliberately tries to work with some of the smaller and more marginal 
farms: farms where the priority is to produce staples for home consumption. The Fund provides a package and 
operating method that should allow very poor farms to participate. Most of the farmers enrolled reportedly have 
between two and five acres (0.8 – 2 hectares), so they are clearly small-scale, but because of a lack of monitoring 
data, it is not certain what fraction of the most marginal farms participate in the districts where they operate. 
That marginal farms may rarely participate does not necessarily mean that they do not benefit from 
these schemes, albeit indirectly. In several cases, additional jobs have been created both on the farms 
of commercialised smallholders who have intensified their operations, as well as in processing. Typically 
horticulture is extremely demanding of field labour, for planting, weeding and harvest. Dairying requires 
labour: in Kenya it is estimated that every 2,000 litres of additional milk generates an extra job on farms. 
Processing plants can be labour intensive as well. The pineapple juice and packing plant of Blue Skies in 
southern Ghana employs 1,500 workers; in northern Mozambique small-scale cashew shelling plants provide 
jobs in small rural centres where there are few other opportunities; and 1,500 mainly female workers process 
shea butter in a factory in Burkina Faso. 
GENDER
In Sub-Saharan Africa it is estimated that roughly half the work on farms comes from women (FAO 2011). 
Rates of inclusion of women vary considerably from case to case. In some, such as OAF, the Uganda potato 
grower groups, some Rwanda coffee cooperatives and the shea butter nut processors of Burkina Faso, 
women form the majority. In other cases, and often in some of the more commercial schemes, they are in a 
small minority as producers. 
This does not necessarily imply that women do not benefit: to the extent that they live in households with 
increased incomes from better market linkages, they may well benefit. Much depends in these cases on how 
equitably incomes are shared within the household.  
Women may benefit indirectly, most notably in jobs. For example, green beans in Kenya and tea harvesting 
can create jobs for women. Off the farm, soya farming in Togo has led to some women boosting their income 
by cooking and selling soya-based products in their communities. In Benin, a rice scheme has allowed some 
women to specialise in parboiling rice for local sale. Although these jobs are often unskilled and probably 
poorly paid, there are exceptions: in the Nununa Foundation of shea nut producers in Burkina Faso, some 
women have been trained to take on skilled jobs in processing. 
Against these probable and possible benefits, there are concerns that women are often under-represented 
or absent from the governance of local collectives, and that commercial schemes may allow men to take 
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control over the more valuable assets of the households and the incomes they generate, while women find 
themselves obliged to do extra work in the fields and in processing. Little has been done to check whether 
these fears are justified: most reports contain little analysis of how the schemes affect gender relations. 
Evaluations of these schemes are scant in any case, and not surprisingly even scantier when it comes to 
addressing the often quite complicated and difficult-to-monitor changes within the household in access to 
incomes, work obligations and decision-making that would be needed to assess gender impacts. 
In summary, the schemes reviewed here are for the most part, not aimed at improving equity, either social 
in general or of gender in particular. They do aim to reduce poverty by working with smallholders, most of 
whom are poor and vulnerable, even if the smallholders directly engaged are not amongst the most poor 
and vulnerable. The latter group is often excluded. As, often, are women as farmers. 
This does not, however, mean that they do not benefit. Nor can we be sure that they are not more 
disadvantaged by the schemes. The evidence is simply not available. More information is needed on social 
processes at village and household level, as well as more rigorous assessments of general equilibrium 
effects as indirect effects work their way through rural economies. 
13. Formal treatments of forms of linkage in the literature take the other 
approach: they describe the forms seen, assess their functions, then try to 
explain why certain forms fit particular circumstances. Although such studies 
come at the issue from another angle, they reach similar appreciations: 
no universal form of link exists, much depends on the crop, frequency of 
transactions, specific assets, prevailing levels of trust, etc. Hence it is no 
surprise many different forms can be effective in particular circumstances. 
14. The burden of illness tends to fall on children disproportionately and 
hence on the mothers who care for them: rural health is thus a matter 
of gender equity as well as personal welfare.
15. As a share of the value of air-freighted imports, transport costs fell from 
around 12% to 8% of value between 1974 and 2004 (World Bank 2008).
16. These are not necessarily sophisticated: 
‘Tools such as Porter’s Five Forces, the Boston Consulting Group matrix and 
SWOT analysis have been the staple of management consulting firms for 
many years. Combined with standard qualitative data collection methods 
such as focus group discussions, key informant interviews and participatory 
mapping techniques, such tools are useful for analyzing data to allow value 
chain stake-holders to make informed decisions.’ (Campbell 2010).
17. This section has been written with public agencies in mind. The same 
issues, however, arise for any private firm as well. A large corporation, for 
example, faces the same challenges when setting up a unit to source 
supplies from smallholders. 
18. Role culture in the sense of bureaucracy, one of the four archetypes of 
organisational culture proposed by Handy (1993). Task or matrix culture, on 
the other hand, would be ideally suited to the demands of this kind of work. 
CHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES
19. Judging leadership from secondary accounts is difficult. That said, in 
at least three of the cases — Blue Skies, Linking Local Learners, and 
the One Acre Fund — there are mentions of leaders who have taken 
risks to translate their visions into reality. There are probably more 
examples in the cases, including those who have led in a less visible 
(and extrovert) fashion. 
As a general point, leadership is not always documented in the 
literature, since judgments of effective leadership tend to be 
subjective: especially when those reviewing and evaluating draw 
largely on a current snapshot of the operation since the value of 
leadership is not easily appreciated at one point in time. Over the 
longer run, the value of good leaders becomes increasingly apparent, 
however subjective the criteria may be, since there will be more 
objective indicators of programme success that can reasonably be 
attributed at least in part to leadership. 
20. There are, however, schemes being started in northern Ghana to provide 
index-based weather insurance for small-scale farmers, where farmers 
received a pay-out when rainfall is below stated thresholds measured 
at local weather stations. Research shows that farmers value insurance 
highly. (Karlan et al. 2012)
21. The same has been seen in Central America where a US 
multinational declared its intention to source from small farmers, but 
saw little cooperation from local managers who were not prepared to 
change their sources if that might have compromised the reliability 
or quality of supply. 
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Donors are well placed 
to encourage learning 
from initiatives - by 
reviewing experiences 
and disseminating the 
lessons.
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 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
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4.1 KEY POINTS
In most low income countries of Africa, development needs to include the majority of farmers who are 
smallholders. Currently many smallholders farm at low productivity, in yields per hectare or returns to 
labour, yet often the technology already exists to greatly increase productivity. This technology often goes 
unused because inputs are too costly and returns for surplus produce are too low and this arises because 
smallholders lack effective links to markets for produce, inputs and credit. Markets in rural areas all too 
often do not work well for small-scale farmers: costs of information given uncertainties mean that too little 
is supplied, at too high a cost. Overcoming these limitations is one of the main challenges in rural Africa.
An objection here is that most farmers in Africa make use of markets, the links exist, and therefore there is no 
need for public action. The problem, however, is that many of the links are incomplete, ineffective or inequitable. 
These failings may not entirely stop development, but they introduce a friction with costs in foregone growth, 
development and poverty reduction. Hence, the concern to remove the friction of poor links to markets, 
convinced that this will stimulate more investment by farmers and those who want to work with them, more 
innovation and higher productivity — leading to faster agricultural growth with benefits for the wider economy, for 
rural people engaged with farming, and thus, by derivation, for many people who are poor and vulnerable.
The importance of improved links is widely recognised in practice. Across the continent many agencies, 
projects, groups and individuals are trying to improve the links. Reviews of these experiences report 
similar conclusions.
In this report, common conclusions have been organised in a framework that sees forming more 
effective links as involving three considerations about the business case, the approach to linking and 
how to organise links. 
Links will only work if there is a return on investment for smallholder farmers and for their partners in the 
supply chains. That depends, above all, on governments fulfilling basic roles for the economy: the creation 
of an enabling investment climate; and the provision of rural public goods and transport in particular. 
If that sounds demanding, it should not: conditions do not have to be perfect, the key is to remove the 
worst failings, such as the high implicit taxation of agriculture that prevailed in the 1970s and that slowed 
agricultural growth at that time. The corollary applies as well: once these conditions are met, (some) 
progress is likely by private initiative alone.
The business case will be stronger if those working with smallholders recognise that often the most 
promising markets, by size, requirements for produce and reliability, are the rapidly growing domestic and 
regional markets of Africa, especially for higher-value complements to staple foods. High value export 
markets, especially for niches such as organic and fair-traded produce, may be attractive options for some 
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smallholders, but not for the large majority. Those working with smallholders need also to recognise that 
priorities for farmers may be in production or marketing, in maximising gains or reducing risk — priorities 
which will probably change with time. 
Approaches to linking need to enable and facilitate, not to substitute for the initiatives of farmers, traders 
and processors, while offering temporary essential support for new ventures. Intervention needs to be seen 
as a learning process that will encounter obstacles to be overcome. There are challenges here for agencies 
working with smallholders in operating flexibly, over the relatively long term, and with the possibility of 
initiatives failing. Good leadership can help marry these needs to the demands of most formal organisations 
for planning and control. 
The third aspect is about how links are organised. Catalysts and champions have to be found to take 
initiatives; farmers usually need to be grouped to cut down on transactions costs. Forums in value-chains 
can help to focus attention on bottlenecks, to generate consensus on action, and to reform policies and 
regulations where needed. 
The actual arrangements or models by which smallholders do link to markets are various, even if often the 
cases documented involve some form of contracting. However, rather than focusing on the models, the key 
appears to be process: of bringing together the three elements of the framework effectively. 
THE LIMITS TO MARKETS: SOCIAL INCLUSION
The experiences reviewed here are, for the most part, not necessarily as socially inclusive as might be 
desired. They reach smallholders many of whom are poor and vulnerable, to be sure; but most do not reach 
the very poor and highly vulnerable. 
Could they do so? It is difficult to argue with the logic of the private initiatives: that small farmers will not 
benefit from market links unless they have enough land, labour, capital and skills to make use of the links, 
and perhaps also to take some additional risk of market engagement. The priorities for the very poor and 
highly vulnerable probably lie in other fields: in stimulating the demand for labour, in building their assets, in 
improving their health and education and in providing social protection, especially for those unable to work. 
It is probably then a mistake to see market linkages as necessarily involving multiple wins. As one 
review puts it: 
Overall … learning suggests we should not continue to expect multiple wins — on poverty reduction, 
food security, security of supply, ecosystem services and rural development — from the single-minded 
approach of including farmers and their organisations in value chains and ‘empowering’ them in markets 
as beneficiaries of external initiatives. To get the future right for the majority of small-scale producers 
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who cannot readily participate in modern value chains, or for the many youth with aspirations out of 
farming, we must recognise other layers of the picture. (Vorley et al. 2012)
This is not to say that some of the initiatives reviewed could not be combined with the additional measures 
to reach the poorest: such as helping them rent or buy additional land, providing them with initial capital 
grants, giving them insurance against risks that would otherwise deter their engagement, etc. Some of them 
might then also benefit from market links, but that would require increased effort, time and budgets. Market 
links will not provide a cheap, short cut to social inclusion. 
SCALING UP
How can the best of the initiatives observed be scaled up or replicated more widely? There is a danger in this 
question: that of expecting that the answer lies in a particular and specific arrangement — a particular form of 
contracting, or an ideal agricultural cooperative, for example. Looking to scale up particular forms, to quote Martin 
Evans22, can be a will o’ the wisp: there will never be a single method, firm, agency that does it: development is a 
matter of incremental change. It is the processes and approaches, not forms, that lead to effective links. 
So, what has to be done to improve links on a wider scale? To begin, some of the more important matters, 
such as an enabling investment climate, apply at the national scale and do not require further scaling. 
Provision of rural public goods can clearly be specific to locations, but the policy arena is again national: that 
is where decisions on overall priorities and budgets are made.23
What then does need scaling — in the sense of replication and adaptation — are processes of enabling, 
facilitation and learning; supported by a necessary architecture that includes catalysts, forums to consider 
specific problems and that sees farmer groups formed. The agenda for public action then might be reduced 
to the following considerations. 
One, catalysts can be private actors or public agencies. Private actors need incentives: those seen are usually 
those of an exceptional business opportunity — in exporting or in replacing costly imports by less costly 
domestic production. Firms will probably only invest when they judge that they have sufficient competitive 
advantage to take advantage of the opportunity for long enough to recoup their extra investment in 
arranging supplies from smallholders. How then, are they to be prevented from using their market power to 
take undue advantage of smallholders? The best answer to this awkward question comes from Webber and 
Labaste (2010): make sure that markets are contestable even if not currently contested, so that the threat of 
competition exercises a discipline.
The other catalysts are public agencies, typically non-governmental organisations. They will make the 
effort on the basis of their mission, provided of course that they can be funded. As will be set out in the 
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next section, there are good reasons to invest in their efforts, above all in looking to make more effective 
links for food crops. 
Forums for value-chains are another factor in some of the effective experiences. Provided they are set up so 
that they have the backing of key players and they are prepared to consider the evidence and engage with 
other actors, then they look to be worth encouraging. 
As important as anything else in looking for replication of success is to encourage innovation, learning and 
dissemination of experiences. To date, the investment in learning and dissemination has not matched the 
extent of practical initiatives in the field. 
This needs to be accompanied by a more general effort to monitor changes taking place in rural Africa. 
While change in rural Africa may not be as fast as it could be, to imagine that little change is taking place 
misleads. On the contrary, improvements are taking place, as would seem the case in parts of Eastern and 
Southern Africa, to judge from recent reports that most farmers have a wide choice of traders looking for 
maize, even in remote villages (Jayne et al. 2011); and that Kenyan farmers increasingly find that inputs and 
services are available much closer to their farms than they were a decade ago (Chamberlin and Jayne 2009), 
and especially so for farmers in the more remote areas. 
THE COST OF INITIATIVE: PUBLIC SUBSIDIES
For higher-value produce there may be little need for public action, beyond governments — and those who 
work with them — fulfilling their basic public roles. Yet for staple crops, there seem to be no private initiatives 
that address the lack of access to inputs for food crops faced by many smallholders. If there are, they do not 
show up in the literature, including semi-formal publications, or in discussions with those actively working in 
the field. The four programmes that do so, see section 3.3, depend on public support. 
Is there then a case for a public subsidy to the kind of programmes reviewed? There may be. The social 
gains may be larger than the private ones, as Dorward (2009) has pointed out in relation to fertiliser 
subsidies in Malawi. A public intervention may lead to additional production that, in a landlocked market 
where prices within the band marked by import and export parity prices depend on local harvests, pushes 
down prices to the benefit of poor households that are net buyers of staple foods. This applies quite 
widely in inland Africa, where high transport costs mean that the price bands can be large, so that domestic 
harvests have a major influence on domestic prices. 
If that is accepted, then the question is less one of subsidy or not, but rather of how small a subsidy may be 
sufficient to ensure that poor farmers get access to inputs. Some public subsidy schemes look expensive, 
such as the Zambian fertiliser subsidies, since there are considerable leakages to those who can well afford 
Leaping & Learning | linking smallholders to markets in Africa
84
the inputs. OAF’s approach, on the other hand, looks economical. The subsidy here does not seem to cover 
the costs of the inputs, so much as the headquarters functions of the programme, including planning, 
monitoring and evaluation. Studies are needed to compare costs, but it is a working assumption that a 
relatively small NGO has more incentives to control costs than do, for example, government ministries or 
AGRA with its considerable resources from foundations and donors. 
4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
Even if not all questions can be answered, there are clear recommendations that stem from this review that 
apply to governments, donors, non-governmental organisations and large-scale agricultural business.  
FOR GOVERNMENTS
Focusing first and foremost on the two basic public roles of setting an enabling investment climate and 
providing rural public goods has paid off handsomely for countries in Asia, and for some countries in Africa. 
The advice does not require perfection that would be difficult for most low income countries to achieve; but 
rather, to make sure that any gross failings and deficiencies are remedied.
Recognise that in providing rural public goods, most of the budget will not be going through the ministry of 
agriculture, but through ministries of transport, education, health and water. 
Set up forums for value-chains with the participation of key players. Make sure that they have the political 
support and active engagement of ministers. Be prepared to react to findings, above all in being prepared to 
change policies and regulations.
Consider establishing challenge funds that can support initiatives to make more effective links. These may 
be in the form of open and competitive sources of finance, or else administered through ministry units that 
scout for opportunities and allocate funds accordingly. 
Monitor the results of these initiatives, learn from them and publish the results. 
FOR DONORS
Support governments in fulfilling their basic roles, both in technical assistance on the investment climate, 
and in funding investment in rural public goods in low income countries where public resources are 
currently insufficient.  
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Beware of projects to promote the engagement of smallholders with high-value, export markets. 
While some will make sense, beware that these may cause actions that potentially benefit many more 
smallholders to be lost to view. Reading Vorley et al. 2012 would be a useful antidote. 
Take processes in market engagement seriously. Fast, certain, failure-free, programmable results cannot be 
expected. If this cannot be handled by the organisational structures and systems — and indeed culture — of 
the agency, then look to fund agencies that can act flexibly and take risks. Funding NGOs directly, or setting 
up challenge funds is one way to do this. Investing in a portfolio of efforts gives the best chance that there 
will be sufficient success to justify the outlay. 
Encourage learning. Look to fund reviews of experience, documentation and dissemination of lessons. Link 
practitioners, look for innovative ways to communicate. 
FOR NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
Monitor, learn, document and publish. 
Deal with the possibilities of failure. Having a portfolio of activities is one answer. Beware of depending too 
much on particular projects and models: keep options open, stay flexible. 
Participate in stakeholder forums.
FOR LARGE-SCALE AGRICULTURAL INVESTORS
Smallholders can be suppliers to processors, exporters and retailers, but finding effective ways to do this 
may take time and encounter setbacks.
It may not be necessary to acquire land and go into farming, with the corresponding investment costs and 
risks; even if there are exceptions, such as nucleus estates, to guarantee throughput to processing plants and 
to act as demonstrations for out-growers.
22. Comments from Martin Evans, Chair of Farm Africa and highly 
experienced agri-business specialist, 25 February 2013.
23. Discussions about rural roads, agricultural research and rural 
education do not normally begin in terms of this or that region: 
they are first and foremost about the priority and budgets allocated 
to these sector activities, after which come considerations of the 
geographical programming. 
CHAPTER 4 ENDNOTES
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In collaboration with the Food, Agriculture and Natural 
Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN), and the 
Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC), A4I and ODI hosted 
three workshops in Southern, Eastern, and Western 
Africa in mid-2012 to present and gauge response to the 
emerging findings of the Leaping & Learning study, and to 
learn from practitioners working in the field on connecting 
smallholder farmers to markets. 
The workshops included case study presentations from 
practitioners working in the field, and ‘smallholder cafe’ 
sessions, where workshop participants in small groups 
discussed two questions, before feeding back on their 
discussion to the larger group. The questions discussed in 
the ‘smallholder café’ sessions were: What works linking 
smallholders to markets? and What needs to be done to 
promote links from smallholders to markets?
Attendees came largely from non-governmental 
organisations providing technical assistance to 
farmers, such as SNV and ACDI-VOCA. Also present 
were academics, public sector and donor government 
representatives.  
Summaries of some key points from the workshops follow. 
More detail on each workshop is available for download on 
the ODI website, and blogs describing them are available 
on the A4I website – see below for links. 
SOUTHERN AFRICA REGIONAL 
WORKSHOP
Dr Lindiwe Majele Sibanda, CEO and Head of Diplomatic 
Mission of FANRPAN opened the day with a presentation 
on Linking Farmers to Markets in Southern Africa.
A case study was presented by Dyborn Chibonga, CEO of 
the National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of Malawi 
(NASFAM), presenting NASFAM’s work in rejuvenating 
Malawi’s groundnut exports. A value-chain approach, 
from seeds, planting and harvest, to buying, warehousing, 
lab testing, grading and processing before sales to 
export, local or retail markets was used, including an 
intervention in Aflatoxin management.
APPENDIX A: WORKSHOPS HELD
WORKSHOP WORKSHOP REPORT (ODI) BLOG ON THE WORKSHOP (A4I)
Southern Africa
Held in Johannesburg on July 9th, 
2012, with participants from Malawi, 
Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe.
http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/
odi-assets/events-presentations/1310.pdf
http://ag4impact.wordpress.
com/2012/07/10/asking-the-experts-
connecting-smallholders-to-markets-in-
southern-africa/
Eastern Africa
Held in Nairobi on July 11th, 2012, with 
participants from Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Rwanda and Uganda.
http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/
odi-assets/events-presentations/1311.pdf
http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/
odi-assets/events-presentations/1311.pdf
Western Africa
Held in Accra on July 13th, 2012,  
with participants from in Ghana, Mali  
and Nigeria.
http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/
odi-assets/events-presentations/1309.pdf
http://ag4impact.wordpress.com/2012/07/14/
making-it-happen-connecting-smallholders-
to-markets-in-western-africa/
87
Sithembile Maunze, Senior Economic Development 
Advisor of SNV presented a case study on SNV’s work 
with rural agro-dealers in Zimbabwe — the Rural Agro-
dealers Restocking Programme (RARP) — this is also 
discussed in case 26 in Annex C. She also discussed 
the Zimbabwe Agricultural Development Trust (ZADT), 
a vehicle to provide soft capital for the benefit of 
smallholder farmers in agricultural value-chains 
Some key points that came up in the smallholder café 
discussions included:
• Agricultural programmes might not reach everybody, 
particularly the poorest; for them there should be 
social programmes in place.
• Building trust among partners is key.
One of the café tables came up with this schema
Innovation/
public-funded
• Inputs
• Finance
• Markets
Scalability
Sustainable
business
models
Private sector
Public sector
(supporting)
Case Studies
Proper documentation
+   -
Learning & M&E, 
impact evaluation
Extended ex-post
evaluation?
Definition
Capacity 
development in 
agribusiness and
farmer business
development
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• There is a real benefit in having retailers, private sector, 
farmers and so forth together in the room for discussion.
• Simple things, like financial literacy, are needed; there 
is an underinvestment on the Human Resources 
side.Governments need to invest in rural roads and 
provide the basics. 
• Production has to be demand-driven and assessed 
for profitability. 
• Donors need to sustain efforts; the 3-year model 
is a big constraint – it could take 5 to 10 years for 
programmes to become sustainable, but the patience 
of donors is shorter. 
• Developing horticulture is different to developing 
grains. It is also interesting to link horticulture and 
livestock as cropping systems.
• Once farmer associations form, it is easier for industry 
to penetrate.
• The role of NGOs like SNV is that of a stepping stone. 
This changes farmers’ contract arrangements after a 
while, so it’s like a stage that moves them on to being 
independent.
• There a need to coordinate and map out what’s going on 
in the field to avoid duplication. There is also a need to 
learn from monitoring and reporting what is going on.
• Business models have to be sustainable but this 
may take a long time, particularly where overcoming 
systemic problems. 
• We need frameworks by which we can identify best 
practice when we see it; case studies are central. 
Properly documented case studies are weak. There 
needs to be more monitoring and evaluation (MandE) 
and impact evaluation 2 or 3 years later.  
EASTERN AFRICA REGIONAL 
WORKSHOP
Dr Wilson Songa, Agriculture Secretary, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Government of Kenya opened the day with 
a presentation. He emphasised small-scale farming as a 
business as well as a way of life, and went on to talk about 
transformations in marketing systems and elements for 
ensuring success in linking smallholder farmers to markets. 
A case study was presented by Stephanie Hanson from 
One Acre Fund describing One Acre’s four-part service 
model: distribution of farm inputs within 2 kilometres 
of where farmers live, financing, extension and market 
facilitation. 
Florence Kariuki of Equity bank presented a case on how 
Equity Bank links to smallholder famers in agribusiness 
value-chain financing. Equity bank targets small-scale 
producers chiefly supporting them in the purchase of farm 
inputs, such as seeds, fertilisers and chemicals. 
Some key points that came up in the smallholder café 
discussions among participants included:
• One problem to overcome is that of transport; 
physical infrastructure is necessary - especially the 
last 30km from village to markets which costs so 
much.
• In Kenya there are 6 or 8 ministries involved in 
agriculture already. Nutrition is very important but if 
the agricultural issues are so spread out, how can the 
health issues marry up?
• Farmers should diversify; this is a good strategy 
to increase food security, but specialisation too 
brings benefits; there is a paradox of diversity: food 
productivity needs to be raised to allow specialist 
crops for market. 
• Adopt a value-chain approach; a clear understanding 
of all the actors is needed. Create strategic 
partnerships along the value-chain; build synergies, 
add value.
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• Exit strategies must be addressed from the beginning 
– in terms of time, budgets and sustainability. 
• If the public extension isn’t there, farmers should have 
the option to pay for private extension.
• ICT in agriculture can be very effective. For 
instance, with livestock: the Maasai in Tanzania 
now have mobile phones to monitor sales of 
livestock, so they are changing, building houses, 
owning property, motorbikes and so forth because 
they don’t sell at a loss. If tele-centres could be 
available for other crops, farmers could monitor 
prices for other crops and livestock.
• After projects have run their course, how do you 
ensure that extension service providers are able 
to learn the emerging technologies and are able 
to support farmers on the ground so it becomes a 
sustainable framework?
• Brokers have developed a very bad name ‘he makes 
you broke’ – but they have a very important function. 
Laws are weak and don’t recognise brokers properly – 
they need to be engaged. 
• How do you address the issues of seasonality in terms 
of supplies, because that is a challenge across most 
of the value-chains.
• Value addition: for example for a perishable fruit 
like mangoes, post-harvest losses are very high, 
had experiences like supporting a cooperative 
society to be able to install a processing unit 
through a credit guarantee, and now they are 
processing pulp which they are selling to Del 
Monte, they have a contract, and at the same time 
they are selling fresh mangoes, to address the 
issues of post-harvest losses.
WESTERN AFRICA REGIONAL 
WORKSHOP
Dr K.Y. Amoako, Founder and President of African Center 
for Economic Transformation (ACET) opened the day with 
a speech. He asked a series of WHY questions: Why can’t 
we feed ourselves? Why do farmers receive such a small 
fraction of the final value of their produce? Why hasn’t 
Africa being able to use its tremendous agriculture potential 
as a stepping stone for economic transformation? And 
beyond the WHY, a series of HOW questions: How do we 
promote the production of crops? How do we create the 
enabling conditions for smallholders to benefit from the 
opportunities created by commercial agriculture? And how 
does government play a role in this process?
A case study was presented by Lassina Konaté from SNV 
World. He gave an in-depth presentation about SNV 
World’s work with cotton chains in francophone African 
countries. 
Awusi Mahama Natoma of SNV Ghana then presented a 
case study about effective shea value-chain development 
in Ghana.  
Some key points that came up in the smallholder café 
discussions among participants included:
• Donors must stop undermining sustainable development 
by giving things away for free. Planning for long-term 
sustainability is critical. One way is to ask farmers to 
contribute to a social fund linked to incentives. Farmers 
provide some funds separate to what they pay as 
membership, so they learn to pay for services.
• We need to come up with a good exit strategy: e.g. 
Technoserve have an exit strategy that worked in the 
sorghum market with Guinness. Technoserve proved 
the agricultural market worked, and after four years, 
Guinness believed the model was robust enough.
• Agro-dealers need to serve the farmer community so 
farmers don’t have to travel. 
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• Build demand among farmers for inputs – also include 
financing credit. Psychology of always buying the 
cheapest thing needs countering. There is a lack 
of awareness regarding payback for investing. It is 
important that farmers become aware that extra 
investment in good quality inputs will produce 
benefits.
• To avoid side-selling this you have a buyer 
monitoring system and a hub that all the farmers 
bring the crop to.
• Whatever we do we should be gender sensitive, 
because in all of the fields where we’re working 
there is a gender imbalance. Also need to consider 
other demographic realities e.g. growing rural youth 
population.
• Donor project periods and delivery expectations 
need to move from 1 or 2 year projects to 3 to 5 
year projects: though it’s more like 5 to 10 years to 
prove if something works or not. In the aeroplane 
analogy: the runway is 3 to 4 years, and then 
takeoff is 4 to 5 years, therefore the whole project 
= 8 to 9 years
• Finance is crucial: need to engage with the banks to 
show that perceived risk is much higher than actual risk.
Two schemas the café tables 
came up with
Rural investment climate Government 
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M
on
ey
People
Donors operate here
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How can the rural investment climate and supply of rural 
public goods be compared across countries? 
Rural investment climate: critical dimensions include 
rural security, degree of net assistance to agriculture, 
inflation, policy instability and predictability, risk of 
expropriation and political co-option. Two measures 
were taken:
• For the national investment climate, the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index 
for which annual estimates are made for 33 African 
countries since 2004 was used, one of the most wide-
ranging of measures of business environment, starting 
with the macro-economy (Christy et al. 2009).
• For specific incentives that apply to farming, we 
used the net rate of assistance to agriculture indices 
that Kym Anderson and colleagues have devised. 
This covers 21 countries in Africa and assesses the 
degree of protection afforded by trade policy and 
exchange rates, as well as public spending on the 
sector. For a long time nominal rates of protection 
have been a strong factor affecting the vigour of 
agriculture in Africa where typically in the past 
the NRA has been massively negative for some 
countries, with farmers taxed well over 50% in effect 
— and worse for some export crops. 
• [Alternative measures might be the inflation rate 
and the degree of exchange rate overvaluation 
measured by the real exchange rate compared to 
the nominal, but there is no point is this when we 
have the GCI to call on.]
For rural public goods, two measures have been taken as 
indicative:
• Road length divided by population. This has the 
advantage that road length in urban areas will 
be limited, so that this index is much influenced 
by the roads built in rural areas. Road length and 
population are taken from World Development 
Indicators. These statistics are available for almost 
all African countries; and,
• Public spending on agricultural research, expressed 
as a fraction of the agricultural gross domestic 
product. Estimates for this come from the ASTI 
database at IFPRI, for around 32 African countries. 
These should be strong indicators: Asian studies indicate 
that spending on rural roads and agricultural research 
correlate with agricultural growth (Fan et al. 2010). 
The four sets of measurements can be found for 14 
countries, including most of the largest and most 
important in Africa south of the Sahara. Gaps are to be 
found where expected: DR Congo heads the list. There 
are another dozen countries for which three indicators are 
present, so that imperfect indices can still be computed. 
See Table A1 for the scores.
The scores for the four indicators for the 14 countries 
were normalised so for each index we have a measure of 
departure from the mean in standard deviations. This then 
allows indices to be summed. By summing the two measures 
of rural investment climate (RIC) and the two for RPG, each 
country then has a score on these two dimensions. 
This then allows each country to be plotted in a 
two-dimensional space, with the axes placed at the mean 
scores (see overleaf).
This produces a four quadrant diagram that can be 
summarised thus, with examples in the quadrants:
Note, however, that the countries as plotted form other 
possible clusters, as follows:
• Four countries have a good climate and exceptional 
public goods (extreme NE points): Botswana, Mauritius, 
Namibia and South Africa;
APPENDIX B: INDICES OF INVESTMENT 
CLIMATE AND PUBLIC GOODS BY COUNTRY
POOR RIC GOOD RIC
Good Rural Public Goods Zimbabwe Botswana
Poor Rural Public Goods Nigeria Mozambique
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Figure A1  |  Scatter plot of country scores for rural investment climate 
and rural public goods
note: the darker diamonds are the original 14 countries with all scores; the lighter circles are the less perfect indices for 
another 12 countries.
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• A group of seven have a poor climate, but above 
average public goods: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Mauretania, Zambia, Zimbabwe;
• Two countries have a good climate but in public 
goods they are close to the average: Kenya and 
Rwanda; while
• Most the rest are not that far from the origin, and indeed, 
Senegal has scores almost exactly at the means. 
The countries and the quadrants to which they belong are 
mapped below:
This framework will be used to try and get a spread of 
cases across countries that reflect the four possible 
outcomes in the quadrants. Clearly there are some 
countries omitted, but most of these countries are not 
those for which case studies have been written.
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Table A1  |  Country scores on indices 
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Benin 3.78 -0.36% 0.55 2,483 236 5 0.67 0.35 -0.33 -0.27 1.02 -0.61
Burkina Faso 3.25 0.02% 0.47 6,481 270 5 -1.3 0.38 -0.47 1.68 -0.92 1.2
Côte d'Ivoire 3.37 -25.25% 0.6 4,479 384 5 -0.85 -1.9 -0.24 0.7 -2.76 0.46
Ethiopia 3.76 -9.85% 0.37 501 65 5 0.62 -0.51 -0.65 -1.24 0.11 -1.89
Ghana 3.65 -1.35% 0.69 3,299 603 5 0.19 0.26 -0.08 0.12 0.45 0.04
Kenya 3.82 9.27% 1.26 1,769 244 5 0.84 1.22 0.93 -0.62 2.06 0.31
Madagascar 3.36 0.82% 0.27 2,776 322 5 -0.88 0.45 -0.83 -0.13 -0.43 -0.96
Mali 3.39 0.12% 0.72 1,462 289 5 -0.79 0.39 -0.03 -0.77 -0.4 -0.8
Mozambique 3.31 14.91% 0.51 1,461 288 5 -1.08 1.73 -0.41 -0.77 0.65 -1.18
Nigeria 3.45 -5.43% 0.36 1,377 207 5 -0.57 -0.11 -0.67 -0.81 -0.69 -1.48
Senegal 3.7 -7.51% 0.9 1,324 400 5 0.37 -0.3 0.29 -0.84 0.07 -0.55
South Africa 4.34 2.10% 2.53 7,682 1,444 5 2.8 0.57 3.2 2.26 3.37 5.46
Tanzania 3.56 -12.44% 0.35 2,293 173 5 -0.13 -0.74 -0.69 -0.37 -0.88 -1.06
Uganda 3.56 0.37% 1.17 2,475 569 5 -0.15 0.41 0.78 -0.28 0.27 0.5
Zambia 3.67 -28.47% 0.3 5,795 1,275 5 0.27 -2.19 -0.79 1.34 -1.92 0.56
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Mean 3.6 -4.20% 0.74 3,044 451        
Standard 
deviation (SD)
0.27 11.06% 0.56 2,051 382        
Median 3.56 -0.36% 0.55 2,475 289  -0.13 0.35 -0.33 -0.28 0.07 -0.55
Correlation        0.04  0.42  0.46
Botswana 4.05  5.21 13,243 4511 4 1.69  7.96 4.97 1.69 12.94
Burundi 2.95  1.26 1,835 161 4 -2.44  0.93 -0.59 -2.44 0.34
Cameroon 3.61 -0.14%  2,259 287 4 0.03 0.37  -0.38 0.4 -0.38
Chad 2.87 -0.06%  3,877 31 4 -2.74 0.37  0.41 -2.37 0.41
Gambia, The 3.84  0.62 2,253 435 4 0.92  -0.2 -0.39 0.92 -0.59
Mauritania 3.2  1.43 3,120 909 4 -1.5  1.24 0.04 -1.5 1.28
Mauritius 4.31  3.94 1,624 1600 4 2.7  5.72 -0.69 2.7 5.02
Namibia 4  2.1 26,029 3582 4 1.51  2.43 11.2 1.51 13.63
Rwanda 4.19  0.58 1,397 265 4 2.22  -0.27 -0.8 2.22 -1.08
Sudan  -11.93% 0.27 308 112 4  -0.7 -0.84 -1.33 -0.7 -2.17
Togo  -0.57% 0.41 1,771 497 4  0.33 -0.58 -0.62 0.33 -1.2
Zimbabwe 3.33 -38.73%  7,754 1473 4 -1.02 -3.12  2.3 -4.14 2.3
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The figure below illustrates the countries cases were 
taken from and the commodities involved.
Full text for the 31 case studies researched for this report 
can be downloaded directly from the ODI website, at the 
following link: www.odi.org.uk/leapandlearn
APPENDIX C: CASE STUDIES
Figure A2  |  Map of Africa locating the cases   
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